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1 Talking cognition: Mapping and making the terrain 
________________________________________________________ 
Jonathan Potter & Hedwig te Molder 
 
Overview 
This book addresses issues of talk and cognition.  For the first time some of the 
world‟s experts on interaction analysis have been brought together to consider the nature and 
role of cognition.  They address the question of what part, if any, cognitive entities should 
play in the analysis of interaction.  They develop different answers.  Some are consistent with 
current thinking in cognitive psychology and cognitive science; others are more critical, 
questioning the idea that cognition is the obvious and necessary start point for the study of 
human action.   
The question of the relation of language and thought has been a central one in 
cognitive and developmental psychology for more than 30 years.  For the contributors here 
the focus is not on language as it is traditionally understood but rather on talk or, even more 
specifically, on talk-in-interaction.  That is, not on language as an abstract set of words, 
meanings, or a system of contrasts as it has usually been conceived, but talk as a practical, 
social activity, located in settings, occurring between people, used in practices.  This 
approach has significant implications for the way traditional issues of cognition are treated.  
Talk and cognition have been brought together only rarely in the past, and often for particular 
purposes local to one discipline.  However, there are some important precursors to the current 
enterprise, and we will describe them in detail below.   
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It is worth noting at the outset that because of its interdisciplinary focus this book is 
likely to have audiences with different levels of knowledge, understanding and expectation.  
In particular, we hope it will be of interest to at least three groups of researchers.  First, it will 
be of interest to those people whose primary topic is the study of interaction.  The issue of 
how (if at all), or in what way, cognition figures in interaction is a live and complex one with 
important implications for how analysis can be done and what might be possible.  Second, it 
will be of interest to discursive psychologists and the wider community of social 
psychologists who have attempted to develop an alternative to traditional social cognitive 
perspectives.  For them, it will refine several of the issues and highlight the value of 
considering them in terms of natural interaction.  Third, we hope the book will be interesting 
to the very broad community of cognitive scientists.  Cognition has been understood in a 
wide range of ways in this community (some of which we will describe below) but only 
rarely has the start point been research on natural interaction. 
The contributors to this book are some of the foremost analysts of natural interaction 
in the world.  Although each has his or her individual take on things, they mostly draw on one 
or more of the connected approaches of ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and 
discursive psychology.  We will have more to say about these approaches later.  For the 
moment we will use thumbnails.   
Ethnomethodology is an approach to the methods that people use for making sense of, 
and accomplishing the order of, their social worlds.  It highlights the use of ad hoc, situation 
specific procedures to generate order.  Most recently its emphasis has been on the way action 
must be understood in terms of the full, embodied, practical specifics of its setting.  The key 
figure in the development of ethnomethodology is the sociologist Harold Garfinkel 
(Garfinkel, 1967, 2002).  In this collection Michael Lynch, David Bogen and Jeff Coulter 
have been most associated with this perspective.   
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Conversation analysis is the study of natural talk as a medium for action and 
interaction.  A very large body of studies from a conversation analytic perspective have been 
done on both everyday and institutional talk.  Conversation analysis has its origins in the 
lectures of the sociologist Harvey Sacks (now published as Sacks 1992), and the work of his 
colleagues Gail Jefferson and Emanuel Schegloff (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson, 1974).  
Many of the contributors to this collection have a broadly conversation analytic perspective, 
including Bob Sanders, Anita Pomerantz, Douglas Maynard, Nora Schaeffer, Robert Hopper, 
John Heritage, Paul Drew, and Robin Wooffitt.  This predominance reflects the way 
conversation analysis has become one of the most powerful and empirically cumulative fields 
in the study of interaction.   
Discursive psychology is an approach that considers psychology as an object in and 
for interaction.  That is, it focuses on how psychological categories and constructions are 
used by people in everyday and institutional settings.  While ethnomethodologists and 
conversation analysts have mainly worked within sociology and have often found issues of 
cognition rather peripheral, discursive psychologists have mainly worked within psychology 
and consequentially have a longer history of addressing these issues.  Key figures in the 
development of discursive psychology are Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (Edwards, 
1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992).  In this collection Derek Edwards, Hedwig te Molder, 
Jonathan Potter and Robin Wooffitt (again) are most associated with this approach.   
There is considerably more theoretical and analytic homogeneity here than even this 
listing of just three approaches suggests.  Both conversation analysis and discursive 
psychology pick up from and develop themes from ethnomethodology.  Moreover, for the 
most part all three approaches emphasise that:  
a) Talk is a medium of action. 
b) Talk is locally and situationally organized.   
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c) The point of view of the interactant is basic to understanding talk-in-interaction.  
d) The primary analytic approach is empirical study of natural interaction.  
These features have led researchers in this area in a very different methodological direction to 
most cognitive scientists.  In particular, the emphasis on action, context and natural talk leads 
away from working with either experimental manipulations or invented and decontextualized 
examples.  It is worth emphasising, however, that although this body of work has provided a 
basis for doubt about those methods it was not, on the whole, this that led researchers in the 
direction they took.  The tradition of work in conversation analysis evolved out of a 
combination of novel theorizing about interaction stimulated by Garfinkel and Sacks, and the 
development of tape recording technology that allowed conversation to be studied in a way 
previously impossible.  Having developed a powerful analytic approach for working directly 
with records of interaction, experimental simulations of interaction seemed to be of limited 
value and potentially misleading.   
The broad sweep of the arguments here means that we will inevitably not be able to 
cover all potentially relevant literature.  For example, we will not cover the writing of critics 
of cognitive approaches such as Gergen, Harré and Shotter (e.g. Gergen, 1994, 1999; Harré, 
2002; Shotter, 1983) who work largely with theoretical and conceptual analysis.  Examples of 
such work are collected together in Still and Costall (1991), and include a number of 
arguments inspired by the work of Gibson (1979).  This work has some significant virtues, 
yet it does not provide for the focused investigation of questions about cognition in 
interaction that is developed in the chapters collected here.   
In the rest of this introductory chapter we will try to accomplish a series of things.  
First, we will describe some of the questions that the book is intended to illuminate.  Second, 
we will consider some of the historical, conceptual and philosophical features of the notion of 
cognition, including its relation to language.  Third we will characterise some of the key 
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features of the set of perspectives that have been developed in the broad field of cognitive 
science, and cognitive psychology more specifically.  This will introduce a set of issues that 
will help to explicate the relevance of work in interaction described later in this chapter, and 
in the chapters that follow.  It is also intended to highlight the variety and complexity of what 
cognitive researchers have achieved and what points of entry into this work there might be 
for interaction researchers.   Fourth, we will describe the way issues of cognition have been 
dealt with in existing work on interaction, concentrating particularly on ethnomethodology, 
conversation analysis and discursive psychology.  Fifth, and finally we will provide a 
synoptic overview of the contributions to this book ending with some comments on future 
progress.  
 
1. Questions of Cognition and Interaction  
 
The questions addressed in this collection are derived from empirical studies of 
interaction.  The book is intended to extend and clarify issues to do with the nature and role 
of cognitive entities in interaction analysis.  However, it is precisely that focus that makes for 
some interesting and potentially novel implications for more traditional cognitive 
psychologists and cognitive scientists. 
  The papers in this collection are relevant to a range of questions.  Some of the most 
important are: 
 How does cognition figure in the analysis of interaction?  Alternatively, can (and should) 
such analysis be done without recourse to cognitive notions? 
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 If speakers draw on cognitive notions, what is their status?  That is, what kind of thing is 
cognition for participants in interaction?  How is it invoked, described and oriented to by 
speakers in the course of interaction?   
 In the strongest case, is interaction only explicable in terms of a set of cognitive 
precursors (cognitivism)?  How far can these precursors reflect lay notions and 
orientations of conversational participants and how far must they be derived from 
technical analyses?  
 How does interaction research throw light on continuing questions about the possible 
relations between mental terms and cognitive entities?   
 What implications does the exploration of these questions have for experimental work in 
cognitive science? 
These are complicated questions that raise fundamental issues about method, theory and the 
nature of psychology.  The aim is to clarify them, underscore their significance, and show the 
way towards their answers.  Some papers consider a cognitive level of analysis indispensable 
(e.g. Sanders).  Some papers suggest that interaction analysis can reveal the role of particular 
kinds of cognitive entities (e.g. Schaeffer & Maynard, Drew, Pomerantz).  Some suggest that 
analysis should respecify cognitive notions in interactional terms (Lynch & Bogen, Wooffitt).  
Some develop an agnostic approach (Hopper) or wish to consider cognitive notions in terms 
of topics or orientations in participants‟ talk (Edwards & Potter).  One paper (Coulter) 
provides a trenchant (and conceptually based) critique of the whole enterprise of cognitive 
science. 
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2. Cognition as an Object in Language and Philosophy 
 
Characterizing contemporary cognition and its development is not an easy task.  
Cognitive science is now a broad and heterogeneous intellectual field cutting across the 
disciplines of psychology, computer studies, anthropology, linguistics, neuroscience, and 
philosophy.  It mixes highly technical conceptual and metaphysical analyses with issues that 
arise out of programming and domain-specific applied work on computer systems and human 
factors.  There is no single notion of cognition cutting across this field.  Histories in textbooks 
and encyclopaedias cite a wide range of philosophers cited as key figures (including Plato 
and Aristotle, of course) as well as a varied selection of 19
th
 and 20
th
 Century psychologists 
and figures from other disciplines.  Let us start with the dictionary. 
 
The term cognition 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2002) helpfully distinguishes an everyday sense of 
cognition from a more philosophical notion: 
1. a. The action or faculty of knowing; knowledge, consciousness; acquaintance with a 
subject. (Obs.) 
1447 O. Bokenham Seyntys (1835) 154 Illumynyd she is wyth clere cognycyoun In hyr 
soule. 
1528 Lyndesay Dream 577 Filicitie they had Inuariabyll, And of his Godhed cleir cognitioun. 
1604 T. Wright Passions v. 237 With conscience and perfit cognition of innocencie. 
1606 Shakes. Tr. & Cr. v. ii. 63, I will not be my selfe, nor haue cognition Of what I feele. 
1682 Sir T. Browne Chr. Mor. (1756) 106 A retrograde cognition of times past.  
1796 Burney Mem. Metastasio II. 389 Tasting the first aliments of scientific cognition.  
b. Apprehension, perception. (nonce-use.) 
1822 Lamb Elia Ser. i. iii. (1865) 34 In thy cognition of some poignant jest.   
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2. Philos. a. The action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense, including 
sensation, perception, conception, etc., as distinguished from feeling and volition; 
also, more specifically, the action of cognizing an object in perception proper. 
1651 Stanley Poems 231 This Divines call intellectual intuitive cognition. 
1690 Locke Hum. Und. iv. iii. §6 Finding not Cognition within the natural Powers of Matter. 
1847 Lewes Hist. Philos. (1867) I. Introd. 113 A faculty of cognition a priori. 
1879 Adamson Philos. Kant 45 The several elements which, according to Kant, make up 
the organic unity of Perception or real Cognition. 
b. A product of such an action: a sensation, perception, notion, or higher intuition. 
1819 Shelley Peter Bell III, 473 note, Peter's progenitor… seems to have possessed a 
‘pure anticipated cognition’ of the nature and modesty of this ornament of his 
posterity.   
1856  Meiklejohn tr. Kant's Krit. P.R. 79 The fact that we do possess scientific a priori 
cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics.   
1873  H. Spencer Princ. Psychol. I. iii. viii. 369 With purely intellectual cognitions… also 
with… moral cognitions.   
1881  J. H. Stirling Text-bk. Kant 468 Let a cognition be intellectually what it may, it is no 
cognition proper, it is not properly Knowledge, unless and until it have an actual 
perceptive application.   
A few things are worth noting about these definitions and the examples quoted.  First, 
an idea of cognition residing inside the person (e.g. „in hyr soule‟ from 1447) goes back 
several hundred years.  Second, both the everyday and philosophical senses of the term have 
an epistemic element.  Cognition is related to knowledge; it is cognition of something.  This 
reflects the Latin root of cognition as getting to know, acquaintance, knowledge.  The move 
from Latin to English, then, can be understood as a move from an objective to a subjective 
view of knowledge.  Third, cognition can be of something which is itself  „psychological‟ 
(obviously the idea of psychology must be used with caution here or we will end in vicious 
circularity).  Thus there is „perfit cognition of innocencie‟ or „cognition Of what I feele‟.   
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Alternatively, it can be something „outside‟ the person, such as „times past‟.  Fourth, note that 
the philosophical senses of cognition reflect the argument between empiricists and 
rationalists, with cognition requiring „actual perceptive application‟ versus the idea of „a 
priori cognitions‟ of „mathematics and general physics‟.  Finally, we can see the linking of 
cognition to „perception‟ that is at the heart of much modern cognitive psychology. 
 
Philosophical precursors to cognitive science: Descartes and Locke 
The modern philosophical account of cognition is crucially dependent on the work of 
two 17
th
 Century philosophers: Rene Descartes and John Locke.  Descartes is, of course, the 
philosopher who most famously helped shape modern thinking about the nature and role of 
cognition.  He addressed epistemic issues about truth and knowledge through considering 
what could be fallible in the quest for what could be indubitable.  For him, the world of 
objects might not exist because, after all, they might be the vivid illusions of dreams.  Yet 
there has to be an „I‟ doing that thinking, whether true or illusory, and that could be the 
foundation for knowledge.  As he put it: 
It was absolutely essential that the „I‟ who thought this should be somewhat, and 
remarking that this truth „I think therefore I am‟ was so certain and so assured that all 
the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of 
shaking it (Descartes, 1970: 101) 
We might not be able to see how things are in the outer world, but we do know their 
appearance in our inner world.  Nothing, in the end, is better known to the mind than itself.  
By inventing a superior class of inner perceptions, Descartes ingeniously attempted to 
surmount the agonizing problem of the outer world's deceitfulness. 
As Rorty (1979) argues in his critical analysis of the history of Western philosophy, 
the notion of mind does not emerge in philosophical debates until Descartes.  For the Greeks, 
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the essential matter was how to obtain an unmediated picture of reality, that is, how to see 
reality directly without being distracted by any of its mere appearances.  After Descartes, 
knowledge was still understood in terms of perception, but now the eye as the central 
metaphor for acquiring knowledge had been exchanged for another powerful image: the 
mirror.  Knowledge of the world was no longer directly available, but only through a mirror 
in which nature is being reflected indirectly. As Rorty put it: 'The question "How can I escape 
from the realm of appearance?" was replaced by the question "How can I escape from behind 
the veil of ideas?"' (1979: 160). 
Part of Descartes‟ legacy to cognitive science is a basic mind/body dualism.  In his 
writing it is possible to see this as required to manage a problem of his own making.  Having 
established the special nature of the mind, how can it make contact with anything else?  
Descartes‟ rather ad hoc pineal gland solution was an early attempt to solve a problem that is 
still very much alive in different ways in contemporary cognitive science. 
Descartes set the scene for a treatment of perception as the mind‟s mirror on the 
world, with mind as the solid foundation for knowledge to be built on.  Departing from earlier 
Greek and medieval conceptions, he developed the notion of an idea that would apply 
exclusively to the content of the human mind (Kenny, 1967).  Some fifty years later Locke 
drew on this same notion of an idea in his account of the nature of knowledge and what has 
become a classic picture of the working of language. 
Locke viewed ideas as a basic currency of thinking and therefore philosophy.  These 
ideas came from „sensation and reflection‟.  This is the way the famous white paper (tabula 
rasa) comes to be filled in its „almost endless variety‟.   Knowledge in turn comes either 
directly from experience or, in a move echoed in modern cognitivism, „the internal operations 
of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our 
understandings with all the materials of thinking‟ (Locke, Bk I, Ch. I, pt. 2).  Simple ideas 
 - 11 - 
come through sensation to a passive mind.  Then activities of mind turn these into complex 
ideas through basic processes of combination, comparison or separation.  As he put it: 
The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are chiefly 
these three: (1) Combining several simple ideas into one compound one; and thus all 
complex ideas are made. (2) The second is bringing two ideas, whether simple or 
complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at 
once, without uniting them into one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. (3) 
The third is separating them from all other ideas that accompany them in their real 
existence: this is called abstraction: and thus all its general ideas are made (Locke, Bk. 
II, Ch. XII, pt. 1). 
Mind here is an agent processing information much as, in more refined and technical forms, it 
appears in contemporary cognitive psychology.   
Locke‟s reasoning about mind is bound up with his account of language.  He 
developed what Roy Harris (1988) has described as a telementation account of language.  In 
this account language is understood as a conduit for communicating ideas from one mind to 
another.   
Words are sensible signs, necessary for communication of ideas. Man, though he have 
great variety of thoughts, and such from which others as well as himself might receive 
profit and delight; yet they are all within his own breast, invisible and hidden from 
others, nor can of themselves be made to appear. The comfort and advantage of 
society not being to be had without communication of thoughts, it was necessary that 
man should find out some external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, 
which his thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others (Locke, Bk. III, 
Ch. II, pt. 1, italics in original). 
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Note here the emphasis on ideas hidden invisibly inside the person, and the role of language 
being to make them visible (Coulter develops Harris‟s argument about telementation in his 
contribution to this volume). 
Words are secondary to ideas for Locke.  Indeed, the first use of words is for 
recording thoughts, rather like a Dictaphone might be used to record a letter.  The second use 
is for communicating thoughts.  Because of their conventional and arbitrary nature (Locke 
prefigures Saussure here) he sees words as an imperfect way of transmitting ideas.  The 
recipient may well find them doubtful and uncertain as cues to the precise ideas of the 
speaker.   In contrast, if you are recording your thoughts for yourself using words your record 
can be perfect: 
Any words will serve for recording. As to the first of these, for the recording our own 
thoughts for the help of our own memories, whereby, as it were, we talk to ourselves, 
any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of 
any ideas, a man may use what words he pleases to signify his own ideas to himself: 
and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same sign for the 
same idea: for then he cannot fail of having his meaning understood, wherein consists 
the right use and perfection of language (Locke, Bk. III, Ch. IX, pt. 2, italics in 
original). 
Language, then, becomes an aid to thinking and can enable our own memories and ideas to be 
captured, yet can only capture those of others in an indistinct manner.   
Rorty (1980) has argued that Descartes and Locke virtually invented the modern idea 
of the human mind.  In Greek philosophy there had been no easy way to distinguish what 
might later be called „states of consciousness‟ from objects and events in the world.  
Descartes extended the notion of thought so that it would cover many of what we would 
come to think of as cognitive psychological terms: doubting, understanding, imagining and so 
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on.  Locke extended these ideas into a quasi-scientific programme of considering the 
generation and composition of ideas and the processes this involved.  Words were left as 
imperfect traces of those inner ideas. 
We do not want to suggest that Descartes and Locke are the only important 
philosophical contributors to ideas about cognition.  However, they lay out many of the 
features that stayed in place until the sorts of critique of this picture of mind came from 
linguistic philosophers such as Ryle and Wittgenstein in the 20
th
 Century.  They still have a 
central role in modern cognitive science.  Some of these issues are explored below, 
particularly in Coulter‟s chapter.  For the moment we will move away from philosophy to 
consider the development of modern cognitive science. 
 
3. Modern Cognitive Science 
 
Histories of contemporary cognitive science identify the key dates as just following 
World War II.  For example, Gardner‟s (1985) excellent overview suggests the so called 
„Hixon symposium‟ of 1948 as the setting where a number of key figures who had developed 
their thinking in different fields of war work came together.  Many features of modern 
cognitive science have their origin in work on missile guidance systems, problems of people 
using complex apparatus such as cockpit displays, and the new science of computing.  
Technical advances here went in concert with the major social upheavals of the war, and 
challenges to old orthodoxies.  The most important orthodoxy to be challenged was that of 
the behaviourist tradition that had dominated for the three decades up to the war, particularly 
in North America.  Its role as the position to be countered can be seen in the title of 
McCulloch‟s contribution to the symposium: „Why the Mind Is in the Head‟.  The 
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capitalization of „Is‟ here went against the general behaviourist caution about the attribution 
of inner entities.  Gardner describes this title as provocative in 1948 – yet within thirty years 
the success of cognitive science would make it as orthodox as what came before. 
The five decades that have followed have been a period of furious development for 
cognitive science that has grown up with the evolution of integrated circuits, computing and 
the Internet.  For us the interest is in the nature of the cognitive in cognitive science.  What 
kinds of things are described as cognitive processes and cognitive states?  What styles of 
explanation are characteristic in cognitive science?  Our overview of cognitive science is not 
intended to be comprehensive.  Instead we will highlight some central moments and features 
of the area. 
 
Information theory and artificial intelligence: Shannon, Turing and Marr 
Theoretical and technological advances in the mid 20
th
 Century led to the 
development of information theory.  Shannon‟s crucial insight was that the states of an 
electronic switch (on/off) could be treated as equivalent to logical propositions (true/false).  
This was refined into the notion of a bit of information, that is, the information required to 
reduce future uncertainty by choosing one of two equal options.  This was crucial in the 
development of programming languages that would run on computers, where the transistors 
(on/off switches) in integrated circuits would allow large, and (with time) enormous, amounts 
of information to be „processed‟ (Gardner, 1985).   
Information here is an abstraction.  It has been separated from both particular 
languages such as English or French, and also from particular processing or communication 
systems.  It can be transmitted via wire or radio, and processed by different kinds of 
computers.  Crucially it was possible to start thinking of human brains as processors of 
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information.  This, in turn, could allow the old behaviourist concepts of stimulus and 
response to be transformed into new information processing concepts of input and output.   
If human brains could be treated as processors of information like computers, could 
the reverse be true?  Could computers be treated like brains, or, more pertinently, can they 
think?  Alan Turing‟s (1950) famous and influential answer to this question is to turn it into a 
practical rather than an abstract or philosophical question.  The Turing test involves an 
imaginary interrogator who asks questions of an agent in another room via a teleprinter.  The 
job for the interrogator is to find out whether she is talking to a man or a machine.  The job 
for the machine is to answer questions as if they were a man.  They can be evasive, playful, 
or whatever.  Here Turing imagines A as a machine pretending to be a person: 
Q: Please write me a sonnet on the subject of the Forth Bridge. 
A: Count me out on this one.  I could never write poetry. 
 (Turing, 1950: 234). 
The key point about this test is that if the computer passed, if it were programmed in a way 
that convincingly imitated a person, then there were no good grounds for saying it was not 
thinking (Turing dismissed a lot of what he took to be poor grounds, such as that it did not 
have a soul, machines can‟t be creative).  We can note at this point that issues of personhood 
are foregrounded, but issues of what interaction is, and how language operates in activities 
such as imitation are taken for granted. 
Whether or not cognitive scientists accepted the full implications of the Turing test, 
they increasingly used metaphors from computing and information processing for 
understanding human cognition – input and output, hardware and software, storage, 
programming and so on are commonplace.   
As Gardner (1985) notes this has led to continued disputes on how strongly to treat 
the hypothesis of artificial intelligence.  On the one hand, the weak view of artificial 
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intelligence treated programming as a way of exploring potential ways in which humans 
could solve problems or process information.  On the other, the strong view suggested that 
programs are intelligent in themselves, or even that they have their own cognitive states.  
Searle‟s (1980) so-called Chinese room argument was designed to criticise such an idea (in a 
playful inversion of the Turing test).   
More directly interesting for our current purposes is not the question whether 
machines can be programmed to think, but whether a programmed machine that can duplicate 
human skills is operating in the same way as the human.  That is, should we expect to find 
some underlying psychological correlate of the programming?  This kind of question became 
most refined in the influential work of the neuroscientist David Marr.  For us Marr is 
important not just because he is one of the most important figures in cognitive science, but 
because his work highlights some of the very different ways in which notions of cognitive 
processes and entities are understood. 
Marr worked on visual perception, but his arguments are taken to have more general 
implications for cognitive science.  In his research he argued that to understand the visual 
system it is necessary to work with different levels of analysis (Marr, 1982 is the central 
reference here).  The first level is that of computational theory.  This specified the goals and 
functions of the system.  For example, one of the things that the visual system will need to do 
is translate two-dimensional images from each eye into a single three-dimensional image.  
This might involve a range of more complex functions.  The second level is that of 
representation and algorithm.  What kinds of procedures might operate on the images to 
render them into three-dimensions?  What kind of programs and representations would be 
required?  The third level is that of hardware implementation.  Experimental work will 
attempt to discover organizations of axons and visual neurons that might be the systems for 
processing such information about stereoscopic vision.   The success of work such as Hubel 
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and Wiesel (1977) on the early processing of visual information in the eye and Lettvin et al. 
(1959) on specialised receptors in the neurophysiology suggested that more sophisticated 
processing structures might exist.  For Marr research is a two way process, where 
computational theory and its representations might guide studies of physiology, but studies of 
physiology might suggest alternative algorithms and, ultimately, computational theories.   
Marr‟s theory shows how early ideas about information processing and metaphors of 
the mind and brain as sophisticated computers have been developed since Turing and 
Shannon‟s time.  In particular, he suggests that particular organizations of brain physiology 
might be designed to do specific jobs.  Note also that Marr‟s work is giving a central place to 
the operation of computer programs on representations.   The centrality of modularity and 
representations is something well established in much of recent cognitive science.    
Marr‟s division into three levels is only one way of breaking things up.  For example, 
it is conventional in cognitive psychology to distinguish a rather different three levels of 
information processing: mental, cognitive and neural (e.g. Best, 1999).  The mental level of 
processing is focused on things that people are conscious or aware of how people manipulate 
images or ponder problems in maths.  The cognitive level of analysis is focused on processes 
of analysis that may not be part of people‟s consciousness.  The neural level is the actual 
operations of neurons, ganglions and so that perform the tasks that are involved in the 
cognitive and mental processes. 
 
Linguistics as a vision of competence: Chomsky and Skinner 
In Gardner‟s (1985) history of cognitive science he traces the significance of the 
linguist Noam Chomsky‟s work for cognitive science back to the MIT symposium on 
information theory of 1956.  Chomsky impressed others with the formal precision of his 
work.  He was not just offering a new theory of language, but changing the whole way in 
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which language should be understood and studied.  His review of Skinner‟s (1957) 
behaviourist account of language was widely treated as devastating and providing an 
important impetus to the establishment of a cognitive science as the successor to 
behaviourism.   
Chomsky‟s (1959) review argued that behaviourist stimulus-response models of 
language learning could not account for the creativity of language.  People can and do 
produce unique but also grammatical utterances for which there is no plausible reinforcement 
history.  Moreover, he noted that it is particularly unclear what stimulus might be relevantly 
eliciting any particular linguistic response.  The stimulus-response account starts to become 
empirically empty.  Chomsky encouraged a move away from the strongly empirically based 
work of Skinner toward an approach much more guided by theory.  Indeed, he emphasised 
the power of people‟s intuitions about language, and particularly its grammatical form, 
suggesting that in many cases empirical work was not necessary to check claims.  At the 
epistemological level, this was backed up by a move to a more nativist concept of language to 
counter Skinner‟s relentlessly empiricist image of language being learned through 
behavioural conditioning.  He suggested that all of us have an innate Language Acquisition 
Device (LAD).  This enables a child learn a particular language for the first time through 
hypothesis testing backed by knowledge of human universals.  In this way the child could 
arrive at the specific grammar appropriate for the particular language in her culture 
(Chomsky, 1965). 
Let us stand back and tease out some features of Chomsky‟s approach that have 
implications here.  The first is that Chomsky‟s critique of Skinner‟s and others‟ approaches to 
language emphasised the importance of grammar and grammatical universals.  In criticising 
both behavioural approaches and then current linguistic orthodoxy he redefined what is 
essential about language.  This is seen most powerfully in his well-known distinction between 
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competence and performance (Chomsky, 1965). Competence is a person‟s knowledge of the 
set of underlying rules of grammar that enable the generation of well-formed grammatical 
sentences.  Performance is the actual sentences that speakers produce and that may be a-
grammatical or ill formed in a variety of ways.  The important research enterprise would be 
to focus on competence which, while it may not be observable, is what is crucial about 
language.  Performance may be hard to eliminate from research, as there is no direct 
empirical route to the study of competence (Chomsky emphasised the value, but also the 
fallibility of the researcher‟s grammatical intuitions).   Nevertheless, the task of this form of 
research was to get beyond the flawed world of performance to the rather more fundamental 
world of competence. 
A second, and closely related, implication of this is that active, practical, situated and 
interactional features of language are secondary.  Indeed, the focus is very much on language 
rather than, for example, talk (something that happens between people in settings), 
conversation (with its interactional nature), or discourse (with its performative emphasis).  
Skinner‟s behaviourist approach was taken to have shown the futility of a more empiricist 
approach to language.  With the benefit of hindsight, particularly hindsight illuminated by 
thirty years of conversation analysis, there is something a little absurd about the way 
Chomsky confidently and successfully framed Skinner as the arch empiricist.  His Verbal 
Behaviour is full of imaginary examples and speculations, and all of these are tightly built 
using the theoretical language of behaviourism: operants, stimulus and response, rewards and 
punishments, mands and tacts (the specific terms for utterances with different kinds of 
reinforcing roles).  It is very far away from an observational science of language in use. 
A third implication of Chomsky‟s approach was that cognition was essentially 
modular.  This went strongly against the behaviourist approach to language learning that 
treated it as the consequence of the sum of different stimuli and reinforcements.  For Skinner 
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there was no essential difference between general laws of learning and the laws that operate 
when learning language.  Chomsky‟s postulation of the LAD was the basis for a vision of 
mental specialization grounded in neurological systems.  This modular vision extended to a 
swathe of mental phenomena became a central part of contemporary cognitive science. 
  
Modules and Representations: Miller and Fodor  
 A key paper in the establishment of the cognitive perspective in psychology was 
George Miller‟s „The magical number seven plus or minus two‟ (1956).  The simple thesis 
(that, for example, people tend to be limited in the number of discrete items they can recall) 
belied the challenge to behaviourist orthodoxy that emphasised plasticity rather than 
limitations.   
Miller went on with Galanter and Pribram (1960) to develop an alternative model of 
action that was based on TOTE units (Test Operate Test Exit).  They used hammering in a 
nail as a simple example.  You test to see that the nail is sticking up.  You operate the 
hammer to bang it in.  You test to see if it is still sticking up and so on as many times as it 
takes.  When you test and find the nail is flush then you exit.  These simple feedback units 
could be combined together to generate more complex actions.  The empirical success of 
TOTE analysis was limited, but its vision of the organization of action was important in 
cognitive science.  In particular, it offered the basis of a modular account, with large numbers 
of TOTE units being yoked together to perform complex tasks. 
A key figure in the development of modular accounts of cognition was the 
philosopher (and close colleague of Chomsky) Jerry Fodor (1983).  His work provides the 
most thoroughgoing philosophical embrace of cognitive science and cognitivism: the 
programme of explaining action by way of the contents and organization of individual human 
minds.  Rather than see mind built up through the combination of simple ideas into more 
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complex (as in the classic picture at the heart of Locke‟s philosophy) he argues for 
specialized modules for different kinds of processing.  These may have their basis in brain 
systems.  For example, Fodor breaks down human  „input systems‟ into a series of modules.  
For vision, say, there might be „mechanisms for color perception, for the analysis of shape 
and for the analysis of three-dimensional spatial relations.  They might also include quite 
narrowly task-specific „higher level‟ systems concerned with the visual guidance of bodily 
motions or the recognition of faces of conspecifics‟ (1983: 47).   
Fodor has developed a classic cognitive science information processing approach that 
puts representations at the heart of mind.  For him, to understand what cognitive processes do 
it is vital to understand how representations are manipulated.  Such an approach is at the heart 
of cognitive science:  
The central hypothesis of cognitive science is that thinking can best be understood in 
terms of representational structures in the mind and computational procedures that 
operate on those structures (Thagard, 2002) 
Fodor (1975) argues that as thinking requires the manipulation of representations, then there 
must be a language of thought.  Representations must be symbolically encoded in some way, 
and there must be rules for the manipulation of those symbols.   And Fodor develops 
Chomsky‟s nativist approach by suggesting that humans have considerable innate knowledge 
that will be triggered by features of the environment.  
 
Internal critiques and developments: Connectionism and situated cognition 
The overview over the past few pages has picked out only a very few features of what 
is the huge and heterogeneous field of cognitive science.  We have tried to give a flavour for 
interaction researchers for whom the main ideas in cognitive science may be less familiar.  
Two sorts of developments are worth noting, because of their potentially radical implications 
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for cognitive science and their interest for the arguments of this book.  They are 
connectionism and situated cognition. 
Connectionism emerged within cognitive science in the 1980s.  It was inspired by 
observations of the operation of networks of computer processors with low capacity joined 
together.  Such networks could be „trained‟ to do tasks, such as discriminate between 
different perceptual arrays.  Information processing would be achieved through the 
„interactions of large numbers of simple processing elements called units, each sending 
excitatory and inhibitory signals to other units‟ (Rumelhart, et al., 1986: 10).   These were 
seen to mimic the organization of neurons in the brain and therefore be better simulations of 
how actual cognitive processes might be performed.  Thus „words, objects, simple concepts 
(e.g., DOG), etc. are assumed to be coded as a pattern of activation across many processing 
units, with each unit contributing to many different representations‟ (Bowers, 2002, p. 414).  
Although a range of attempts have been made to reconcile connectionist approaches 
with mainstream cognitive approaches, there are important tensions between them (see 
Garson, 2002).  Here are three examples.  First, the emphasis on distribution of the 
representation of information across networks goes against the modular and hierarchical view 
in much cognitive science.  Memory and knowledge would not be stored symbolically and 
locally, but would reside in the nature and connection of units.  Second, connectionist 
approaches typically model processing as something happening in parallel across the system 
rather than sequentially in modules.  Indeed, connectionist researchers have argued that the 
speed of processing of neurons means that important cognitive operations must be done in 
parallel because they would be impossible to complete within observed reaction times if done 
sequentially.  Third, classic cognitive science builds on concepts from (a particular version 
of) folk psychology.  For instance, Fodor (1988) argues that the folk psychology of desires, 
goals, plans and beliefs is too good to be false.  It is not just a way of speaking, but also a 
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representation of elements of cognitive processing.  Many connectionists argue that although 
folk psychology is provides intelligibly for human affairs, that fact alone does not make it an 
accurate picture of the organization of cognitive processing.   
Connectionism is very much a development within cognitive science.  Connectionists 
accept most of the same meta-theoretical and methodological premises as other cognitive 
scientists.  They tend to work with computer programming and experimental simulations in 
laboratories.  However, there are critics from with the broad cognitive science tradition who 
have become concerned that some of the taken for granted elements of cognitive research are 
less a product of empirical study as an artefact of particular theoretical assumptions and 
methodological decisions.  For example, Ulric Neisser authored the hugely influential first 
textbook in cognitive psychology (Neisser, 1967).  Yet within 10 years he was arguing that 
the study of cognition had focused too much on cognition and behaviour abstract from its 
natural settings of use (Neisser, 1976).  The rationalist emphasis of figures such as Chomsky 
and Fodor treated many features of cognition as wired in at birth, removing much interest in 
considering them in natural settings.  Moreover, the formulation of many cognitive science 
problems in programming terms (of either a modular or connection nature) treated their 
solution as something to be achieved, at least in the first instance, in the abstract. 
Critiques of traditional cognitive work evolved into a broad programme variously 
described as ecological cognition, everyday cognition or distributed cognition (not to be 
confused with social cognition, that has largely focused on the explanation of social 
processes through the properties of individual cognition – see Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  
Researchers in this tradition have often been influenced by Russian psychologists such as Lev 
Vygotsky.  Their general argument is that cognition is not well understood as a product of 
isolated individual maturation but that features of peoples‟ cognitive competence are formed 
through interaction in situations where culture, language, and features of social settings 
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themselves provide the scaffolding of individual thought (see papers in Rogoff & Lave, 
1984).  The individual is apprenticed into sophisticated forms of problem solving rather than 
developing into them naturally.  For example, Jean Lave‟s (1988) studies of everyday 
mathematical abilities showed that women were able to make subtle proportional calculations 
about special offers on packets of supermarket food that they could not work out when 
presented in the abstract.  The setting and the embodiment of mathematical concepts in 
familiar practices provided the scaffolding for sophisticated computation. 
 One feature of this tradition of research is that it breaks down the customary 
boundary in cognitive science between mental operations and features of the environment.  
For example, Ed Hutchins‟ argues that a largely conventional cognitive science perspective 
can be applied to whole systems rather than just the human agents with them.  He suggests 
this is compatible with the broad project of cognitive science: 
Cognitive science… concerns itself with the nature of knowledge structures and the 
processes that operate on them.  The properties of these representations inside the 
system and the processes that operate on representations are assumed to cause or 
explain the observed performance of the cognitive system as a whole (1995: 266). 
Although this approach has traditionally been concerned with individual agents, Hutchins‟ 
suggests that the unit of analysis can be extended with very little modification to cover a 
larger socio-technical system; this is a unit of distributed cognition (Hutchins & Klausen, 
1996).   
Hutchins applied this perspective to the cockpit of a commercial airliner and 
particularly the issue of how pilots land planes at a speed appropriate for the weight of the 
plane and the configuration of wing flaps.  He makes a range of observations about the 
cognitive properties of this system for representing and „remembering‟ speed through dials 
and displays, and specific configurations and additions to the dials.    
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Both connectionism and the various strands of work on everyday or shared or 
distributed cognition raise profound questions for more conventional cognitive approaches.  
They offer challenges and suggest extensions.  However, for the most part researchers within 
these traditions have accepted cognitivism as the primary form of explanation in psychology.  
That is, to understand actions we need to make reference to some kinds of internal 
representations (whether distributed or hierarchical and localised, whether largely innate or 
built through the internalisation of cultural categories and norms).  Cognition is not just the 
substrate or accompaniment to action, but the most immediate thing that explains action.   
One of the characteristics of the contributions to this collection is that they are not 
working with the assumption that the explanation of action requires an understanding of 
cognitive states or processes of some kind.   Mostly they argue for analysis of interaction that 
is sufficient in its own terms.  However, such an analysis has potential implications for the 
study of, and conception of, cognition; and these are a central focus for this book. 
 
4. Interactional research and cognition 
 
For the most part conversation analytic research in particular, and interaction research 
in general, has developed in the context of sociology and communication departments where 
the key issues are to do with social structure, influence, order and so on (for overviews see 
Hutchby & Wooffitt, 1998; ten Have, 1999).  Conversely questions of psychology have rarely 
been explicitly addressed, and even more rarely have the questions that are fundamental to 
the discipline of cognitive psychology and the broader field of cognitive science been 
considered.  That is not to say that the connections are not there to be made – just that there 
has been no need to make them.  However, this has resulted in a situation where conversation 
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analytic work has developed with varied and often inexplicit assumptions about the nature 
and role of cognition.  And the converse is broadly true of cognitive science; it has developed 
with a model of interaction that is largely stipulative or intuitive rather based on detailed 
empirical work. 
Elsewhere there is a tradition of „discourse processes‟ that has a direct focus on 
psychological issues, but this has tended to use traditional cognitive science methods such as 
experimental studies with vignettes and has paid less attention to natural interaction (for a 
review, see Graesser, et al., 1997).  We will discuss some of this work below.  Discursive 
psychology is the perspective that has addressed cognition in the context of interaction most 
systematically in a psychological context (e.g. Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 
1993; Potter & Edwards, 2001).  We will overview these traditions in turn, starting with 
conversation analysis.  First, however, we will highlight some of the general features that are 
likely to be at issue in interaction research of this kind and cognitive science. 
 
Seven points of potential contrast between cognitive science and interaction studies 
As we have noted above, cognitive science is a broad and heterogeneous field 
encompassing different disciplines and styles of research.  Any generalization is likely to 
come up against a range of exceptions.  Nevertheless, it is useful to highlight some 
differences between the style of research that makes up the core of cognitive science and 
interaction research of the types discussed here.  We will take themes from the cognitive 
work we have just surveyed to make the point most clearly. 
 
(a) Abstraction.  Cognitive science, as we have seen, has drawn heavily on an abstract notion 
of information.  The attempt was to develop an approach to information that was independent 
of content and could allow processing through on/off switches in their electronic or 
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neurological form.  As we noted above, this abstraction has been a fundamental feature of the 
development of cognitive science.  In many ways it has been a strength.  However, 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have both worked against abstraction of this 
kind.  Garfinkel has stressed the need to understand action in terms of all the specific, local 
and idiosyncratic details of settings and procedures (Garfinkel, 2002).  Sacks has stressed that 
no feature of conversation can be excluded a priori from relevance to interaction.  Lexical 
selection is finely and relevantly tuned to requirements of interaction; and elements of talk 
such as laughter particles, or even sniffs, may be coordinated and have interactional 
significance (Sacks, 1992).   
 
(b) Competence and Performance.  Cognitive science has overwhelmingly adopted some 
form of this distinction and seen the explication of competence as a central research goal.  
This has often been combined with a view of performance as chaotic, ad hoc, and intractable, 
a product of multiple uncontrolled variables.  In contrast, both CA and DP have avoided this 
dichotomy.  This is seen, most profoundly, in the preference for dealing with naturally 
occurring interaction captured in audio and video, and transcribed in a way that captures 
details of delivery.  This is not simply a movement from studying competence to studying 
performance.  On the one hand, as Chomsky noted, researching competence almost 
invariably involves some kind of study of performance.  On the other, CA and DP analyses 
are often focused on the organization of performance.   
The subtlety of the move here can be highlighted by considering the different way 
rules are understood.  The rules of Chomsky‟s transformational grammar are intended to 
produce all and only well formed sentences in a language (1957).  In contrast, the rules of 
Sacks et al., (1974) classic work on conversation are intended to explicate the organization of 
speaker transition in talk.  Three things are worth noting about rules in this CA work.  First, 
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the rules do not only account for smooth speaker transitions, they also account for various 
kinds of trouble (such as overlap and delay).  These are characteristic of the sorts of  
(apparent) conversational disorder that encouraged cognitive scientists to move away from 
tackling such material.  Second, note that these phenomena are largely invisible to cognitive 
science work that has used standard orthographic representations of talk.  Third, the 
generation of these rules from performance data is strongly focused on what cognitive 
scientists would call their „psychological reality‟, which is our third point of contrast.   
 
(c)  Psychological reality.  Much work in cognitive science has been devoted to generating a 
system that could produce output that is equivalent to, or similar to, that of competent 
individuals.  The task of showing that this system has a cognitive reality in terms of inner 
psychological representations and processes is a distinct one, as is the further task of 
considering what kind of brain organization of neurones and axons could sustain that task.  
Psychological reality is thus important, interesting, but not necessarily the start point for 
much work in cognitive science.  Again, conversation analysis and discursive psychology do 
not make the same basic assumptions about output, competence and cognition.  Nevertheless 
there is a strong emphasis on what cognitive researchers would gloss as psychological reality 
as they start with the perspective of speakers.  Using the classic linguistic distinction of 
Kenneth Pike (1954), they are emic rather than etic perspectives.  Thus, the rules for turn 
taking do not just generate orderly speaker transition in a mechanical manner; rather their 
normative status means that departures can be highly inferential.  Speakers can be shown to 
orient to these rules as they interact. This is a special kind of psychological reality – not one 
defined by in-the-head mental processes, but by the participants orienting practically in the 
course of ongoing interaction to the relevant features of the interaction.  What this means in 
practice is illustrated in a number of the chapters below.  
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(d)  Ecological naturalism.  We have already noted that from within cognitive science 
researchers such as Neisser and Hutchins have argued for a greater degree of ecological 
naturalism in research.  Nevertheless, only a tiny proportion of such research currently 
studies cognitive processes in natural settings.  It is notable that cognitive sciences have 
developed only the most primitive representational practices for capturing and managing 
natural interaction in the way that conversation analysts have. 
This can be shown in a number of ways.  However, for illustration take the following 
typical example from the methods section of a research article: 
The experimenter began by drawing their attention to the bags of toys and saying, 
“These toys are special. Do you know why they are special? These toys are special 
because each one has a different little thing inside.” The experimenter then opened 
one of the toys and said, “See this toy? Look, it has a sheep inside.” Gesturing to all 
of the other toys she said, “Each one of these toys has a different little thing inside. 
That‟s what makes them special. Each one has something different inside.” (Birch & 
Bloom, 2003: 282).    
This is an idealization of the interaction in a number of ways.  It does not include 
interactional details about, for example, the coordination of the experimenter‟s talk with 
contributions from the child or their displays of recipiency.  Do they display attention?  Do 
they ask questions?  It renders the talk into well-formed sentences with conventional 
orthographic punctuation.  It is not possible to recover information about emphasis, 
intonation, delays and repairs and so on.  The interaction is, in effect, cleaned up and 
abstracted.  Indeed, it is not clear if this is what actually happened in any case or what should 
have happened.  From within the logic of cognitive science this is a quality of the paper.  
However, interaction researchers are likely to be interested in many features of what is going 
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on that are simply obscured in such a representational practice.  The issue here is the 
implication missing these features has for the way cognition is understood.   
Even work such as that of Neisser and Hutchins that has a more ecological focus has 
been based on cognitive presuppositions, and has often been done without the degree of 
attention to interactional detail that we will see treated as essential in the studies below.    
 
(e)  Experimental manipulation.  Cognitive science has typically been developed through 
experimental work using some kind of hypothetico-deductive approach to test models 
couched in terms of variables and abstract processes.  CA and DP have overwhelmingly been 
developed through inductive studies of natural interaction.  The cumulative success of 
conversation analysis has shown the value of an analytic strategy that has not found 
mainstream favour in psychology.  The logic of these research strategies is entirely different 
on a number of levels.  However, the contrast is slightly more complex than this bald 
difference suggests.  Although CA studies are typically attempting to explicate the workings 
of a particular phenomenon in a corpus of conversational data, there is considerable attention 
paid to deviant and counter cases.  The process of analysis involves its own finely developed 
form of hypothesis testing.  In particular, the analysis focuses on evidence that participants 
are actually orienting to the claimed phenomenon – CA‟s own form of psychological reality 
is wired into its method.   
 
(f)  Representation.  Arguably the notion of representation is at the very heart of modern 
cognitive science.  CA and DP both also emphasise the importance of representation (Potter, 
1996; Schegloff, 1972).  However, the cognitive and interactional notions of representations 
are crucially different.  In cognitive science representations are mental entities, perhaps 
represented symbolically or in the form of some kind of program.  In CA and DP, in contrast, 
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the focus is on actual descriptions in actual talk or actual texts, and the involvement of those 
descriptions in actions.  For example, how are particular lexical items selected from an 
indefinite range of possibility to support a particular action (an invitation, say, or a criticism)?  
How are descriptions constructed to be adequate or literal, and how can such constructions 
can be unpicked or undermined in interaction (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1997)?  This practical 
work on representations as interactional objects, involved in practices, has a range of 
potential implications for cognitive science notions ideas of representations as a mental 
currency, not least because the nature of cognitive representations is often methodologically 
dependent on discursive representations in the form of vignettes or answers to researchers‟ 
questions. 
 
(g)  Modularity.  A central aspect of much (non-connectionist) cognitive science is its 
emphasis on the modular basis of cognitive processes.  A range of different modules of 
different degrees of complexity and proposed psychological reality has been proposed.  CA 
and DP have a very different decompositional logic.  Their focus is on turns of talk and 
actions accomplished in talk.  Although they may identify distinct elements of turns and 
actions, they are not attempting to decompose interaction processes into mental modules 
within individual cognitive systems.   
These points of contrast are intended to highlight some initial differences between the 
two broad approaches.  For the most part interaction research has not addressed issues of 
cognition directly – and that is what makes this collection so significant.  However, there are 
some important exceptions to this.  In the next section of this chapter we will briefly review 
some of these exceptions. 
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5. Conversation analysis, ethnomethodology and cognition 
 
We will divide earlier interaction work into conversation analysis, ethnomethodology 
and discursive psychology.  This is a slightly arbitrary division, and risks exaggerating 
differences, but it is designed to make the work accessible particularly to those unfamiliar 
with it.  We will start with the foundational work of Harvey Sacks.  
 
Sacks, talk and cognition 
Sacks‟s working career through the 60s to his untimely death in the mid 70s parallels 
an important part of the development and huge expansion of cognitive science.  And his work 
(mostly captured in transcribed and edited records of his lectures from 1964-1972, now 
published as Sacks, 1992) at times exhibits some of the abstract formalism of cognitive 
science as well as some of its language.  Nevertheless, the approach to language is 
fundamentally different.  He did not start with the John Locke picture of language as a set of 
signs for transporting thoughts from one mind to another.  Instead, he focused on the 
practicality of talking.  In particular, he considered the fundamental issue of how language 
can be something learnable and understandable.  This led very early on to a caution against 
researchers using intuitions about cognition to constrain analysis.  The very first published 
lecture (delivered in the Spring of 1964) ends: 
When people start to analyze social phenomena, if it looks like things occur with the 
sort of immediacy we find in some of these exchanges, then, if you have to make an 
elaborate analysis of it - that is to say, show that they did something as involved as 
some of the things I have proposed - then you figure that they couldn't have thought 
that fast. I want to suggest that you have to forget that completely.  Don't worry about 
how fast they‟re thinking. First of all, don't worry about whether they‟re „thinking.‟  
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Just try to come to terms with how it is that the thing comes off.  Because you'll find 
that they can do these things.  Just take any other area of natural science and see, for 
example, how fast molecules do things.  And they don't have very good brains.  So 
just let the materials fall as they may.  Look to see how it is that persons go about 
producing what they do produce (Sacks, 1992, vol. I: 11). 
Conversation analysis has largely followed through this injunction in its practice, and this has 
had the effect of disengaging it from cognitivist thinking.  Instead of attempting to work out 
what entities and processes may „underlie‟ talk as a prerequisite for analysis, the conversation 
analytic programme has developed through considering the organization of actual talk.  Its 
development within sociology meant that it could flourish without attending to cognition, nor 
receive the attention of cognitive scientists. 
Part of the logic of this disengagement for Sacks is his positive focus on what is 
visible/hearable in interaction.  He started from the point of view of conversationalists 
making sense of one another via what is said (in all its rich detail of intonation, stress, timing 
and so on).  From this point of view cognition – mind, thoughts, intentions and so on – are 
relevant to, and involved in, interaction in terms of their current hearability in the interaction 
itself.  Sacks quoted approvingly Freud‟s observation that „the problem is not how is it that 
people come to think that others know their thoughts, but how is it that people come to think 
so deeply that others don‟t know their thoughts (Sacks, 1992, vol. I: 114)?   
As an example, he considers a group therapy session where three boys jointly produce 
a single utterance.   
Joe:  (cough) We were in an automobile discussion, 
Henry: discussing the psychological motives for 
Mel:  drag racing in the streets. 
  (1992, vol. I: 144-145) 
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Sacks tracks this material in a number of analytic directions.  One of his observations is about 
the way this collaborative utterance displays a particular shared understanding.  It is a 
powerful method of for these boys to show that they concur on the topic of the talk; more 
powerful, he suggests, than one of the boys claiming that the topic is one thing, and the others 
agreeing with him.  As Sacks puts it, the way they fit their talk together allows the hearer to 
see „that they „know what‟s on each other‟s minds,‟‟ (1992, vol. I: 147, emphasis added).  We 
will return to this basic topic when discussing Schegloff‟s work and work in discursive 
psychology. 
Sacks developed the issue of shared understanding in a number of ways.  It is not 
surprising, given his sociological background, that this was such a major topic for him.  
Another phenomenon he focused on in relation to this topic was second stories.  He noted 
that a regular feature of the organization of talk is that when one person tells a story of some 
kind the recipient of that story will tell his or her own story, a second story.  This second 
story displays an equivalent experience.  Its important feature is that the speaker does not 
claim they have the same experience; they show they have that experience through the telling.  
Again we see Sacks approaching the issue of shared experience from the point of view of the 
speaker and listener, and considering the question of shared experience as a practical question 
to be solved interactionally– in this case the answer being to provide a second story. 
One of Sacks‟s basic ideas is that talk is recipient-designed in all kinds of non-
accidental ways.  It is a medium for doing interaction, and designed in its rich detail to work 
in that way.  He illustrates this in a manner particularly pertinent to our discussion in a 
consideration of the writing of Virginia Woolf.  He speculates about how her writing 
contributes to a sense of the exploration of inner states.  He notes, for example, that 
descriptions such as „Mr Jones came into the room‟ are informative and communicative for a 
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reader.  However, when Woolf uses a description such as „he walked into the room‟ the lack 
of this kind of recipient-design generates a sense of someone living in their inner world: 
The idea then is that things like non-complete, non-objective, non- nominalized 
references do perhaps reproduce in some way, how a person having feelings that 
they're not in the first instance having by reference to their communicatability, has 
them (Sacks, 1992, vol. II: 405). 
Again, we see how Sacks starts with the interactional and communicative role of language.  
He highlights the special literary work that Woolf engages in to give a sense of an inner life 
in the face of the pervasive emphasis on interaction and recipiency.  
Sacks built many of the foundational ideas in modern conversation analysis in the 
lecture courses available as published volumes.  These ideas were refined and developed in 
larger scale empirical studies by colleagues such as Gail Jefferson and Emanuel Schegloff.   
 
Schegloff and Socially Shared Cognition 
Schegloff (1991) has explicitly addressed the implications of conversation analysis for 
the way the notion of shared knowledge is understood in the context of a collection of papers 
on „socially shared cognition‟ (Resnick, et al., 1991).  He comes at the issue of shared 
knowledge starting with Garfinkel‟s (1967) ethnomethodological discussion of that topic.  
This raised problems for the (still common) cognitive science picture of shared knowledge as 
equivalent to two computer memories having the same contents:  
When even the sense of ordinary words and very simple sentences could be shown not 
to engender identical explications when presented to different persons, when those 
explications themselves had to be reconciled to provide them a “sense of 
equivalence,” and when those reconciliations in turn required such reconciliation, the 
notion of “common culture” or “shared knowledge” as composed of same substantive 
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components – whether norms or propositions – held by different persons became 
increasingly difficult to defend (Schegloff, 1991: 152). 
In line with the basic ethnomethodological programme, Garfinkel developed a procedural 
sense of shared knowledge.  That is, the issue ceased to be a cognitive question of underlying 
mental equivalence, but became a practical one of the way particular methods could be used 
to confirm (or deny) that knowledge is „held in common‟.   
Again, the start point of conversation analysis is different from most cognitive 
science.  Rather than beginning with the isolated individual and adding „the social aspect for 
supplementary consideration‟ Schegloff argues that  „the fundamental or primordial scene of 
social life is that of direct interaction between members of a social species‟ (1991: 154).  This 
points to the centrality of studying how agreed knowledge, understanding and so on are 
managed and coordinated in interaction.  One of the central features about conversation 
highlighted by Sacks is the way that the turn taking system of talk is fundamental to 
coordinating understanding.  Take this simple example.   
A speaker makes an invitation of some kind in a turn of talk.  The recipient‟s very 
next turn of talk is the place where they can accept (or reject, or put off, or query) the 
invitation.  Moreover, and relevantly here, in so doing, that speaker shows that that they have 
understood that they have been invited (and what kind of invitation it is, to what kind of 
event, and so on).  The display of understanding is crucial, because it is the idea of 
understanding as an interactional phenomenon that is live here.  Shortcoming in this display 
may occasion repair in the very next turn – the displayed „misunderstandings‟, „confusions‟ 
and so on can be picked out, commented on, fixed.   
In Schegloff‟s conception there are consequentially different structurally provided 
places where shared understanding (socially shared knowledge or, in a more sociological 
language, intersubjectivity) can be defended in conversation (Schegloff, 1992).  One crucial 
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place is in the turn that follows the invitation (generically, the 2
nd
 turn).  All kinds of issues 
and confusions can be attended to in this place.  The 3
rd
 turn is also crucial.  If speakers can 
reveal their understandings in the 2
nd
 turn then, it can happen, „that they can also reveal 
understandings that the speakers of that prior talk take to be problematic – in other words, 
what they take to be misunderstandings‟ (1992: 1300).  The 3rd turn, then, is the place where 
the repair of such misunderstandings can be initiated.  Indeed, Schegloff suggests that 3
rd
 
turns are the last structurally provided for place for the defence of shared understanding.   
Take the following example of repair in the 2
nd
 turn.   
Marcia: … Becuz the to:p was ripped off’v iz car which 
  iz tihsay someb’dy helped th’mselfs. 
Tony:  Stolen. 
(0.4) 
Marcia: Stolen.  Right out in front of my house. 
   (Schegloff, 1992: 1302) 
The first thing to note about this is that in Marcia‟s first turn we can already see her attending 
to prospective problems of understanding her utterance (she reworks what she is saying to 
„helped th‟mselfs‟, perhaps because of the possible ambiguity of „ripped off‟).  This is just a 
more explicit element of what Sacks notes as the generic feature of talk: that it is recipient 
designed.  Nevertheless, Marcia has not completely sorted out the understanding problem, as 
we can see from Tony‟s turn in the 2nd position.  He offers a candidate understanding of 
Marcia‟s turn, which she confirms.   
Schegloff (1992) suggests that the vast majority understanding problems get sorted 
out through speakers designing their talk appropriately for recipients and the context, through 
speakers modifying and self repairing in the course of that talk, and through recipients in the 
2
nd
 turn picking up problems that, despite this, have appeared in the talk.  Nevertheless, 
 - 38 - 
problems can still arise.  Through a careful analysis of a large corpus of examples Schegloff 
shows how repair can work in the third turn.  Here is a simple example.   
Dan:  Well that’s a little different from last week. 
Louise: heh heh heh Yeah.  We were in hysterics last week. 
Dan:  No, I mean Al. 
Louise: Oh.  He… 
  (Schegloff, 1992: 1203) 
Note the way in this group therapy data Dan, the therapists, repairs the understanding of what 
he has said that was offered by Louise.  Schegloff highlights the sorts of dangers – for 
relationships, for individuals – that can arise from letting failures of understanding slip past: 
When a source of misunderstanding escapes the multiple repair space, a whole 
institutional superstructure that is sustained through talk-in-interaction can be 
compromised.  And since virtually anything in the talk can be such a source of 
misunderstanding, the potential for trouble for that institutional superstructure can be 
vast.  It is against those systematic potentials for subversion of social order that repair 
after next turn is the last structurally provided defence (1992: 1337). 
The broader point to note is the way common understanding is treated here as a procedural 
problem by Schegloff, on an analytic level, and by the participants at a practical level.  There 
are different places for checking and modifying understanding, with different possibilities 
and constraints on them.  These procedures are there for producing and constituting common 
understanding (or „socially shared cognition‟, or „intersubjectivity‟).  There is no way for 
participants to check such understanding independently of those procedures.  This raises 
major questions for work on, for example, common knowledge that attempts to consider it as 
an issue best studied through the examination of individual performance. 
While Sacks‟ and Schegloff‟s work has focused on the implications for understanding 
cognition from conversational organization, other workers within this tradition have 
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developed different issues.  In the work of Lucy Suchman we find a reworking of the central 
cognitive notion of plans. 
 
Suchman and Situated Actions 
Suchman opens her influential work on plans by contrasting two pictures of how 
navigation takes place taken from anthropology.  In one picture (from studies of European 
navigation) the navigators uses universal principals to develop a plan that is then drawn on at 
each stage of the voyage to reach to goal.  In another picture (from studies of Trukese 
navigators of the Pacific) the navigators start with an objective and head off toward it using a 
wide range of information about wind, tide, clouds and so on in an ad hoc manner.  Suchman 
goes on to make the suggestion that studies of European navigation have not looked at it 
carefully enough, for if they would they would have found that it is much closer to the 
Trukese than had been imagined.  Indeed, she suggests that all planned actions are more or 
less like the actions of the Trukese.  As she put it: 
Planned, purposeful actions are inevitably situated actions.  By situated actions I mean 
simply actions taken in the context of particular, concrete circumstances.  In this 
sense, one could argue that we all act like the Trukese, however much some of us may 
talk like Europeans.  We must act like the Trukese because the circumstances of our 
actions are never fully anticipated and are continually changing around us (Suchman, 
1987: ix). 
She suggests that plans can only be a weak resource for activities.  Indeed, their apparent 
central role in action may be as much a consequence of the emphasis on rationality in 
Western cultures than their actual constraining role.   
Suchman develops this argument on the basis of general ethnomethodological 
thinking.  Ethnomethodology has criticized conventional theories of action for 
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underestimating the extent to which actions are dependent on features of local and 
idiosyncratic settings and ad hoc procedures (see Garfinkel, 1967 in particular).   For a plan 
to operate in practice it needs to have specified connections to all of the available details of 
settings and the various contingencies within them.  The risk is that a plan that can guide 
activity through a sequence of actions will need to become huge, perhaps impossibly huge, as 
it attempts the impossible task of encoding all those details and contingencies in symbols.   
Suchman develops a subtly, but importantly different view, which has plans as 
resources for projecting and reconstructing courses of action in terms of prior intentions.  
Crucially the consequence of this view is that „the prescriptive significance of intentions for 
situated actions is inherently vague‟ (Suchman, 1987: 27; see also, Suchman 1988, 2000).  
This vagueness is not a flaw when compared with full specification; rather the vagueness is 
precisely what makes plans useful for their projective and reconstructive tasks – they can be 
applied to an indefinite number of situations in deft and locally specific ways.   
These theoretical ideas are illustrated and extended through a study of people 
operating photocopiers.  This beautifully shows up the highly complex local and ad hoc 
interpretations that users make of the sequences of instructions that are intended to guide 
them through to the completion of tasks such as producing a two-sided bound document.  
Suchman recorded dialogue between users, the various actions they performed on the 
machines (selecting options from lists, pressing buttons, and so on), the information 
presented by the machine (such as numbers on displays), and, finally, the „official‟ rationale 
for the information based on the designer‟s specification of the users goals. 
The analysis shows up the continual reconstruction of what is going on by the users.  
The point of the analysis is to highlight the tension between a planful model of action 
embodied in the machines menu system and the local practices of users, seen from their 
dialogue as they jointly attempt to achieve tasks. For example, participant F selects the 
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change option on the display, adjusting what is displayed from 2 to 0.  The dialogue goes like 
this: 
F: ((reading)) “Describe the document to be copied-”  Oh, we 
already did: No, we don’t want to do that. 
E:  Maybe we have to do it to copy that [i.e. the next page]. 
F: (Looks around machine) 
 (laugh) I don’t know. 
(Suchman, 1987: 151) 
Suchman uses this prosaic and familiar interaction around the photocopier to highlight the 
basic tension between the orderly plans and outcomes that are specified in the manual, and 
provide the rationale for the menu system that the operators work with, and the more messy, 
trial and error, considerations that appear in the talk.  The operators seem to navigate the 
controls of the photocopier like the Trukese across the Pacific – they (often) get there in the 
end, producing their bound and double-sided documents, but their actions on the way are ad 
hoc.  They use the menus, but they provide local interpretations of their sense.  They refer to 
a range of background considerations and reconstruct the orderliness of what they do as they 
go along, often in terms of goals and plans.  
The implications of Suchman‟s work, along with a range of similar studies, comes 
from the questions it raises for the assumptions that action is based on plans.  Insofar as 
cognitive scientists have assumed that human actions works in this kind of planful way, and 
attempt to model the psychological requirements for such planful behaviour, the models may 
be flawed by the failed assumptions.  In particular, it raises problems for approaches such as 
Fodor‟s that posit a language of thought in which plans, etc. are developed.  At its strongest it 
suggests that the whole enterprise of cognitive science may be limited by its failure to 
provide an adequate account of human action in its natural habitat. 
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6. Discursive Psychology and Cognition 
 
Unlike conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, discursive psychology has 
developed largely within (social) psychology and has addressed psychological issues from 
the start.  The general theoretical and analytic framework shares many features with 
conversation analysis and ethnomethodology.  For general overviews see Edwards (1997), 
Edwards & Potter (1992a, 1993, 2001, this volume), Potter & Edwards (2001).  What makes 
it discursive psychology is that psychological topics are considered through the way talk and 
texts are used in action.  Psychology is here a topic in people‟s talk, and a resource for that 
talk.  This involves studying the way psychology is formulated (described, named, invoked or 
more indirectly oriented to) in interaction, as well as studying psychological categories and 
notions (such as mentalistic terms and metaphors) as tools for performing actions. 
One of the features of DP has been its reformulation of a range of central topics in 
cognitive science in discursive terms.  For example, studies have focused on the notions of 
memory (Goodwin, 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992a, b; see also Lynch & Bogen, 1996, this 
volume; Wooffitt, 1991), attitudes (Potter, 1998a; Puchta & Potter, 2002; Wiggins & Potter, 
2003; te Molder, 1999); categories and identity (Edwards, 1991, 1997; Lamerichs & te 
Molder, 2003), emotion (Edwards, 1997, 1999a; Locke & Edwards, 2003) and scripts 
(Edwards, 1994, 1997).  To this list can be added some researchers with a more 
anthropological and interactional focus.  Charles and Marjorie Goodwin have researched 
seeing (Goodwin, 1995, 1997, 2000a, b, c; Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996, 1997).  They have 
considered the way in which seeing is practically accomplished in the work of air traffic 
control, geochemistry and oceanography.  For example, the category jet black has a technical 
sense in particular chemical processes.  Diverse and locally managed practices are used to 
establish that a particular filament can be counted as jet black, and new members have to be 
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apprenticed to be able to see this colour (Goodwin, 1997).  Let us consider examples of DP 
work focusing on the topics of „script formulations‟ and „shared knowledge‟.  
 
1. Script formulations   
Derek Edwards‟s (1994, 1995, 1997) work on script formulations illustrates what is 
distinctive about DP compared with the majority of work in cognitive science.  Edwards 
notes the way that in cognitive science scripts have been treated as abstractions from 
experienced reality which instruct people what to do in familiar situations (Nelson, 1986; 
Schank & Abelson, 1977).  They are mental representations that help people know what to 
expect and do in restaurants, cinemas and other familiar settings, as well as allowing 
exceptional or unusual events to be identified through their deviation from the script.  This 
way of understanding scripts exemplifies how representations are understood in cognitive 
science as fundamental to human conduct.   
Edwards (1994) distinguishes three possible references of the term script.  They are: 
 
Script-W 
Refers to ordered and orderly 
features of the world itself. 
Script-PC 
Refers to features of an 
individual‟s perception and 
cognition. 
Script -D 
Refers to the way events are 
described as orderly,  
or to departures from the 
standard order. 
 
Take the classic example of a restaurant.  Script-W would be the sequence of events that 
happen when going into a restaurant.  Script-PC would be the set of propositional 
representations of actions in sequence tied to the restaurant setting, derived from perception 
of many restaurants.  Script-D would be a description of what went on in the restaurant as 
orderly, or perhaps a description that showed how what went on departed from what was 
expected. 
Classic script theory typically has the order of development of these scripts as: 
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Script-W  Script-PC  Script-D 
The objective nature and order of events (Script-W) is perceptually apprehended by the 
individual.  This perceptual information is then the basis for building up cognitive scripts 
(Script-PC).  These scripts, in turn, provide the semantics for people talking about, describing 
and recalling routine places and events (Script-D).  In contrast, DP proposes that this order 
can be inverted.  Initially this is a methodological by-product of starting with a focus on 
discourse.  However, Edwards notes that once the focus is on Script-D formulations it 
becomes hard to see them as a mere by-product of perceptually refined mental scripts derived 
from regular experiences.   
Edwards shows that script formulations are analysable as interactionally occasioned 
phenomena.  That is, they are not produced haphazardly as conversational non-sequiturs, 
rather they construct events in particular ways as parts of particular actions at particular 
moments in interaction.  In particular, they presenting actions as orderly and following from 
standard routines (as anyone would follow) or as deflected from such routines by 
idiosyncratic personal dispositions.  DP and cognitive science agree in seeing scripting as 
central in human affairs, but DP starts with the practical role of Script-Ds in actions, and 
providing accountability to those actions.  Their place is more central than in cognitive 
science where they have been treated as a reflection of perceptually derived cognitive script-
PCs.  
An example can illustrate the role of scripts in actions and accountability, and some of 
the issues it raises.  This extract comes from a phone call between two elderly Californian 
women and describes some features of a restaurant that one of the women went to.  As such 
is provides an empirical example to consider the nature of scripts against. 
1 Lottie: (...) we went in: to the ((Name)) place on the way 
2  back an: uh e-had (.) uh: they ah an a:fter dinner 
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3  dri:nk 'n God there wasn' a sou:l ih We were the only 
4  ones at the bar an' there was about two parties in 
5  th[e dining] room .p.hhhhh 
6 Emma:   [oYe:h.o ]  
7 Lottie: An' I didn' wanna say-eh: A:deline said she a'ways 
8  wanted uh see it so .hnhh I never said anything 
9  but- uh: Claude said today he says wasn' that the 
10  dirtiest place?=   
11 Emma: =[ Ye:s ]  
12 Lottie: =['n I s]ai:d you know? (.) I: felt the same thing 
13  but I didn't wanna say anything to you but I jus' 
14  fe[:lt] 
15 Emma:   [Ya:]h  
16 Lottie: dirty when I walked on the ca:rp*et.h .hh  
17 Emma: Well you know we were there in Ju:ne  
18  youknow Bud played go:lf inna (.) when the air 
19  conditioner went o::ff? .hhh An' we're about (.) 
20  the only ones that ha:d an air conditioned room 
21  the rest of 'em were bro:ken.  .hhh An' we went down 
22  to breakfast 'n there was only about two people to 
23  help for breakfast with all these guys goin' to pla:y 
24  go:lf. They were a:ll teed o:ff:. 
25 Lottie: Ye[:ah? 
26 Emma:   [.hhhhh Because (.) o*uyo  
27  Bud u-couldn' e:ven eat his breakfast. He o:rdered 
28  he waited forty five minutes 'n he had to be out 
29  there to tee off so I gave it to uh: (.) Karen's: 
30  little bo:y. 
31  (0.7) 
32 Emma: ((swallow)) I mean that's how bad the service w*as  
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33  .hh (.) oIt's gone to pot.o 
34 Lottie: u-Oh*::: (.) e-[Y e : : a h.  Ye< ]  
35 Emma:                [oBut it's ao beauti]ful go:lf 
36  ocourse.o  
  (NB:IV:10:R:35 – from Edwards, 1997: 147-8) 
We do not have any trouble recognizing this string of negative assessments of the restaurant 
as a complaint.  On the basis of cognitive science we would expect the complainable matters 
to be identified by reference to scripts of what should and should not go on at restaurants.  
However, when we start to consider this practically it becomes difficult to sort out what is 
included in the „restaurant script‟ (script-pc) and what is not.  While this script might well 
pick out Bud not getting his food as a problem (line 27), would it pick the insufficiency of 
people at the bar (lines 3-4) or the sticky carpet (line 16), or even the need to get on the golf 
course (lines 27-29)?  These are produced in the description (script-d) as noticeable failures 
of what is to be expected.  Yet if all considerations such as these were to be included as parts 
of the standard restaurant script it would become enormously cumbersome. 
The DP approach is not to consider how such scripted descriptions (script-d) could be 
a product of noticeable departures from mentally represented scripts (script-pc), but to 
consider the way they are constructed from an indefinite range of possibilities to bring off the 
act of complaining.  The script formulation (script-d) warrants the complaint.  Edwards notes 
that the empirical details are finely tuned to the performance of complaining, and potentially 
problematic as features of a cognitive script (script-pc).  For example, some of the elements 
here that are built as negative, might elsewhere be built as „as characteristics of a desirably 
folksy, laid-back, informal sort of restaurant that contrasts favourably with places that are 
antiseptic, regimented and characterless‟ (1997: 148-149). This suggests that having 
decontextualised, mental templates of good restaurants and how they operate might not be the 
most useful prerequisite for dealing with and talking about restaurants where it might be more 
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useful to have „descriptive details as inventively produced and made relevant as part of the 
production of situated accounts‟ (1997: 149). 
DP shifts the analytic focus from cognition to description, from script-pc to scripts-d.  
In part this reflects a different but complementary focus of study.  However, the tension is 
potentially sharper.  Edwards observes that in practice cognitive psychological work on 
scripts does not, and cannot, access scripts-pc directly, but typically works from script-ds to 
script-pcs.  This is true of theoretical treatments, researchers‟ accounts of scripts, 
experimental and simulation procedures and studies of narrative completions.  Thus research 
on script formulations and their role in situated actions is likely to be fundamental to 
appreciating what any possibly reformulated script theory in cognitive science is required to 
explain.  Just as with Suchman‟s (1987) work on plans, the general implication is that 
simplified ideas about the „language of thought‟ and the relation between scripts and actions 
are likely to be flawed.  As Edwards puts it, script formulations provide:  
a basis for accountability, rather than a program for generating the activity itself.  We 
should add that they may also be invoked reflexively within action sequences as 
formulations of the kind of activity it is, as a criterion for what to do next, or for what 
has gone wrong.  But each time they occur in these ways they feature as actions in 
their own right, in the form of situated descriptions (1997: 166). 
 
2. Shared knowledge   
We have already discussed Schegloff‟s approach to the notion of shared knowledge.  
Let us develop this discussion by considering both Edwards‟ (1997, 1998) work on shared 
knowledge and Herbert Clark‟s (1996) discussion of the topic. Clark‟s work is worth 
considering because he is a rare example of a cognitive psychologist who has drawn on 
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interaction research.  It highlights important tensions between cognitive and interactional 
approaches.     
For Clark, when two people share knowledge, or „common ground‟, this is „the sum 
of their mutual, common, or joint knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions‟ (1996: 93).  Clark 
asks: given that two mental spaces contain the same knowledge, how can they be coordinated 
through talk?  For Edwards there are basic problems of this way of formulating the question 
of shared knowledge (Edwards, 1999b).  For him it closes off two issues that are at the centre 
of interaction.  First of all, concerns with knowledge in interaction are inseparable from 
concerns about description.  Second, agreement is something that is established through 
conversational means.  The first of these has been particularly emphasised in DP, the second 
picks up from the tradition running through Schegloff and Garfinkel of treating shared 
knowledge as a procedural issue that we have already discussed.   
Let us illustrate these points with an example.  The following is start of a call to a 
child protection helpline: 
1   ((phone rings)) 
2 CPO:  .hh Hello you are through to the NSPCC? 
3 Caller: Hello em .hh I’m actually phoning (0.2) 
4   f-for some advice regarding an incident that I 
5   witnessed today. 
(CPO = Child Protection Officer, from Potter & Hepburn, 2003) 
At this point the Caller has some knowledge that the Child Protection Officer does 
not.  For Clark common knowledge will be established when both share that knowledge.  
However, the DP perspective highlights the role of specific descriptions and the 
inseparability of knowledge and description.  Note that in using the term „incident‟ here the 
caller does not evaluate, or assign responsibility.  It is the most limited of characterizations.  
As such, it orients to the expertise of the Child Protection Officer by allowing the status of 
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the incident to be established interactionally (Potter & Hepburn, 2003; cf. Zimmerman, 
1992).  From a DP perspective, there is no easy way of separating the „knowledge‟ or „belief‟ 
from its linguistic construction.  Moreover, for the participants the linguistic construction 
must be paramount – it is what they are starting with. 
Edwards‟s second point is that „agreement‟ in interaction is something accomplished 
actively and practically rather than being simply a consequence of the overlap of putative 
underlying „knowledge‟ or „belief states‟.  Again, this is not just a DP point, but follows from 
basic thinking in ethnomethodology and CA.  Take our example again.  After the Child 
Protection Officer has checked for ethical permission and described the role of the helpline, 
she continues with the following: 
1 CPO:  [.hh ] ◦tch◦ okay so y- you (0.2) something  
2   you’ve witnessed today has worried you:. 
3   (.)   
4 CPO:  .h[h h ] u:m (.) can you just tell me a little bit  
5 Caller:   [Yeah] 
6 CPO:  about that. 
Note here the way the CPO ascribes a mental state to the Caller („worried‟ – line 2) as well as 
describing what has worried her as „something‟ (line 1).  Again, for discursive psychologists 
the first issue is what the talk is doing in public and practical terms (again, reflecting the 
necessary primacy of talk for the interactants).  Rather than reflecting a shared understanding 
of underlying mental contents, the ascription „worried‟ can be an element in constructing an 
appropriate stance for the caller from which to be making the call.  Moreover, the word 
„something‟ (like the caller‟s own word „incident‟ earlier in the call) allows the precise nature 
of the phenomenon to be established over the course of the call, supported by the CPO‟s 
skills in child protection.  For DP, then, terms for mental states such as „worried‟ and 
descriptions of events such as „an incident‟ or „something‟ are explicable as delicately 
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interactionally designed specifics.  In this case, they are moves in the business of doing 
orderly reporting of child abuse, occasioned by that business, rather than traces of actual 
mental states and perceptions.   
As with the example of scripts and script formulations, the approach developed in DP 
is not necessarily in opposition to more traditional cognitive science notions.  It presents a 
different focus on mental or psychological phenomena, starting with how those things are 
constructed, managed, and oriented to in natural interaction.  Goodwin‟s studies of seeing, for 
example, start from vernacular understandings of seeing situated in interaction where seeing 
is important, such as the work of archaeologists (Goodwin, 2000a).  Yet one of the 
consequences of such research is often to show up possibly unwarranted assumptions about 
the nature of descriptions and formulations that are embedded in the methods of cognitive 
science and psychology more generally (e.g. Antaki, et al., 2000; Edwards & Potter, 1992b; 
Maynard, et al., 2002; Puchta & Potter, 2002; Schegloff, 1999). 
This way of approaching cognition is strikingly different from that common in 
cognitive science where psychological objects such as perception and memory are well-
established technical domains, fenced in by the standard theories and methods of psychology 
and related sciences.  Often it is not just specific claims that are at stake here, but broader 
approaches to empirical work through which claims could be tested, and the broader 
theoretical perspective in which the claim is embedded.  These obstacles have made dialogue 
complicated – yet the potential is there.  The payoff is the possibility of developing some 
genuinely new ways of considering questions of cognition.  This is one of the goals of the 
current book.  For the rest of this introductory chapter we will overview the contributions and 
set them in context. 
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7. Contributions to this book 
 
We have tried to set the scene for the chapters that follow with a necessarily synoptic 
mapping of the terrain of cognitive science and interaction research.  This highlighted some 
of the subtle considerations about the nature of cognition that are at stake.   As a broad-brush 
distinction between the two areas we might characterize the cognitive science question as 
what kind of competence is required to produce particular actions?  In contrast, the 
interaction question can be characterized as how (if at all) does cognition figure as something 
in and for interaction?  This raises further questions of whether the answer to the former 
question has implications for the latter, and vice versa.  Does the competence concept in 
cognitive science map onto the interactional objects of interaction research?  These 
challenging questions are not going to be answered in a simple way in what follows, but they 
do offer the most elaborate consideration of them that has so far been produced. 
The chapters are organized into two halves.  The first set address basic issues of the 
interface between cognition and action, and the implications of such research for method.  
Whereas Robert Sanders argues for the findings of cognitive science as a limit on the claims 
of interaction research, Jeff Coulter offers the most thoroughgoing rejection of both 
cognitivism as an explanatory principle and cognition as a coherent research topic.  These 
two chapters mark out two boundary cases.  Anita Pomerantz follows up the implications of 
treating cognition as something relevant to interaction analysis by commenting on, and 
refining, an analytic approach.  This couples direct analysis of interaction with the use of 
video stimulated comments from participants who were part of the original interaction.  Nora 
Cate Schaeffer and Douglas Maynard argue the other way, highlighting how basic features of 
interaction have consequences for the responses in standardized surveys.  They consider 
cases that are typically treated as deviations from standard scripts produced by „cognitive 
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processing‟ and suggest that they should be understood as something interactive and 
collaborative.  Finally in this section Robert Hopper‟s chapter marks a transition point.  He 
analyses a corpus of phone calls made during the first days of President Lyndon Johnson‟s 
presidency, a data set perfectly suited to addressing the notion of strategic thinking.  He asks 
what interactional evidence is there that the president‟s talk in those calls was strategically 
planned.   
The second half of the book addresses the issue of cognition through a series of 
studies of how particular „mental phenomena‟ figure in interaction.  Paul Drew analyses 
„confusion‟ and tries to show how analysis might identify it as a „mental state‟, independently 
of participants‟ orientations to that state.  John Heritage focuses largely on the particle „oh‟ 
and its potential relation to changes of mental state.  Robin Wooffitt, and Michael Lynch and 
David Bogen address questions to do with the mental and interactional status of memory, in 
both cases arguing for a non-cognitive approach.  Wooffitt considers the phenomenon of 
flashbulb memories through a discussion of the organization of descriptions of unusual or 
surprising events.  Lynch and Bogen discuss the status of memory in discussion of Oliver 
North‟s testimony to the Iran-Contra affair.  Finally, Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter 
illustrate a non-cognitive approach to claims to knowledge and description, liking and 
thinking. 
We will spend a bit of time describing the argument of each chapter and then draw out 
some of the broader issues they address.  We will take the contributions in turn. 
 
2. Sanders: Testing “Observations”.   
Sanders argues that discourse researchers should pay serious attention to the findings of 
cognitive science.  Indeed, he contrasts his own stance with what he sees as the neo-
behaviourism of discursive psychologists.  He notes that although much of the time discourse 
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researchers can safely ignore the findings of cognitive research there are times that it is 
important to take such findings into account.  He develops this argument by considering 
examples from CA (Schegloff, 1996) and DP (Potter, 1998).  In each case he suggests that 
the analysis involves a hidden attribution of motive to speakers, and that there is evidence in 
the material that alternative motivations might be available, or that the material might simply 
reflect their cognition or, as he puts it, the utterances could be „actually expressions‟ of how 
speakers „in fact did experience‟ something, and that what [they] said could have been 
„dictated by [their] inner state‟.   The challenge for interaction researchers is to show how an 
analysis can be developed that does not depend on an inner, psychological notion of motive 
and to demonstrate the insufficiency of the idea of inner states dictating what is said (for 
more on these arguments see, for example, Potter, 1996; Schegloff, 1972; Wittgenstein, 
1953). 
Sanders considers examples from both child and adult interaction to illustrate the way 
in which interpretations made by researchers should be disciplined by the cognitive science 
findings about processing limitations.  For example, he returns to an extract analysed by 
Schegloff (1996) and suggests that the analysis requires that the speaker is performing a 
particular cognitive task that involves a word search.  The issue is the relation of this task to 
experimental work.  If Schegloff is right his „analysis makes a contribution to cognitive 
science for revealing the power of the cognitive resources we bring to bear in producing 
discourse objects; but if cognitive scientists should find that it is not cognitively possible, 
then Schegloff “observed” something that did not actually take place‟ (Sanders, this volume, 
p. xx).   
Sanders‟ chapters raises fundamental issues about the relation between cognition and 
interaction, and highlights just how difficult they are to answer.  In the case of the Schegloff 
example, if there was a strong tension between his finding and that of experimental work in 
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cognitive science, one place to start might be to ask questions about the „operationalization‟ 
of the task in the experiment.  Maybe the research approach itself would become the analytic 
focus.  The service that Sanders has done is to offer specific and detailed interpretations of 
materials and to highlight their relationships to particular studies in cognitive science.  More 
generally, his challenge is to see how far talk must be understood as psychological motivated 
and dictated by inner states.  One of the features of the chapters in the second half of the book 
is the novel and rigorous ways they pick up and develop these issues. 
 
3. Coulter: Language without mind.   
While Sanders makes the case for interaction researchers taking the findings of cognitive 
science more seriously than they have up to now, Coulter makes a trenchant case for the 
incoherence of the whole cognitive science project.  In a series of publications (particularly 
Coulter, 1979, 1983, 1990; see also Button, et al., 1995) he has drawn on linguistic 
philosophy (notably Ryle and Wittgenstein) and ethnomethodology to argue for a position 
that is anti-mentalist, anti-Cartesian, and anti-„telementational‟‟.  Instead he argues, following 
Norman Hunter (1971), that linguistic expressions convey intelligibility without the need to 
supplement them by something like thinking, deliberation, disambiguation or similar 
operations as commonly claimed by linguistic theory. 
Coulter is dismissive of the common cognitive science approach to discourse 
comprehension involving cognitive representations.  He argues that such an approach 
confuses understanding discourse with interpreting it, and compounds the problem by 
developing empirical tests that presuppose the existence of the very thing they are supposing 
to be testing.  He restates the linguistic philosophical critique against mentalism in a strong 
form that provides a way into this important and relevant body of work.   
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Coulter also devotes considerable space to highlighting what he sees as a cognitivist 
strand in the work of conversation analysis, although much more in the work of Schegloff 
than Sacks.  He suggests that Schegloff has drifted into a form of cognitive science that takes 
parties to an interaction to be performing analysis or cognitive operations such as problem 
solving as they interpret talk.  That is, it turns talking into a talking and thinking combination.  
Whatever the merits of this particular critique of Schegloff, whose take on cognition we have 
illustrated above, Coulter has highlighted a potential ambivalence over the status of cognitive 
terms and cognitive states in conversation analytic work.  We will see this ambivalence 
explored in difference ways in the papers in the second part of this book.  It is clear that most 
of them concede more to a cognitive perspective than Coulter is willing to.  The value of 
Coulter‟ chapter in this collection is that it offers the most fully non-cognitive, indeed anti-
cognitive position, thus requiring those who wish to include a cognitive level of analysis of 
cognitive findings, to make the case for that inclusion. 
Whereas Sanders and Coulter mark out different poles on basic issues of the status of 
cognition, Pomerantz and Schaeffer and Maynard are more concerned with how issues of 
cognition become live in analysis.   
 
4. Pomerantz: Using video stimulated comments.    
Up to now Pomerantz has addressed the role of cognition in interaction research in different 
ways.  On the one hand, she has developed analyses that show how concepts that are 
traditionally seen as falling under the purview of cognitive science (attitudes, knowledge) can 
be understood as interactionally embedded (Pomerantz, 1980, 1984a,b).  Her hugely 
influential work on assessments, for example, shows the way in which assessments can be 
studied as a conversational practice without starting with the speaker‟s attitudes (Pomerantz, 
1984a).  On the other, she has attempted to explicitly address the way cognition should be 
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understood, and enter into, interaction analysis (Mandelbaum & Pomerantz, 1990; 
Pomerantz, 1990/1991).  In her chapter for this volume she addresses issues of cognition 
from a methodological direction, attempting to marry the two strands of her work. 
Many psychological methods take a cognitivist approach to the actor.  When a person 
is interviewed, for example, about why they did something the assumption is that people can 
access again the very same cognitive resources that led to the action in the first place – their 
opinions, say, or desires.   At the least the assumption is that they can access reliable 
memories of the event.  As we have seen above, conversation analysts in particular have been 
sceptical of this way of working, and have overwhelmingly opted to analyse records of actual 
interaction occurring in natural situations.  The advantage is that it captures organizations of 
interaction, and features of actions and events, that are often hard to formulate, let alone 
remember.  For example, the closing stages of telephone calls have an exceedingly regular 
pattern to them (see Hopper, 1992; Schegloff & Sacks, 1973), but it is doubtful that people 
could precisely recall that pattern.   
Pomerantz is well aware of the reasons that conversation analysts in particular have 
avoided interviews and questionnaires.  However, she takes the position that there may be 
cognitive phenomena such as understanding, or aims, that are relevant to peoples‟ practices.  
She argues that there are times when reports of such phenomena are a pathway to the 
phenomena themselves, and that the evidential basis of such reports can be strengthened by 
stimulating people to comment on video showing their own interaction.  Pomerantz develops 
her argument through a rigorous consideration of particular cases.  To end with she considers 
some basic conversation analytic notions – such as display and orientation – and suggests 
that it would be valuable for analysts to go beyond the agnostic stance on cognition implied 
by these terms, and accept – both in principal and for some analytic practices – that it may be 
possible to distinguish real understandings from displays of understanding, and perceptions 
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from orientations.  The challenge here, then, is the suggestion that CA is already more 
cognitivist than is usually recognized. 
 
5. Schaeffer and Maynard: Interaction and “cognitive processing” in survey interviews.   
In this chapter Schaeffer and Maynard focus on the question of how „cognitive processing‟ 
contributes to the conduct of standardized surveys.  It is similar to the Pomerantz chapter in 
its focus on methodology.  However, it argues in the opposite direction.  Whereas Pomerantz 
is arguing for the introduction of some cognitive notions, and some methods underpinned by 
cognitive thinking, into interaction analysis, Schaeffer and Maynard attempt to show that a 
range of phenomena in the administering of standardized surveys are more interactional than 
psychological.  The chapter builds on a series of powerful and influential studies of survey 
research interaction (Maynard & Schaeffer, 1997, 2000; Maynard et al., 2002; see also 
Houtkoop-Steenstra, 2000). 
Schaeffer and Maynard review traditional psychological work on standardized 
interviews that typically treats both smooth answering and troubled answering as the 
consequence of the individual cognitive processing of the interviewee.  However, they 
suggest that a close examination of sequences where there is trouble shows that the 
interviewee‟s actions are closely coordinated with the actions of the interviewer.  For 
example, they note that silences like the one on line 250 of the following are typically treated 
as markers of cognitive processing by psychologists. 
248 IV:  Ohhkay (uh:) would this be considered (.) retail trade 
249      whole(.)tale (.) trade or something else.   
250      (3.5) 
251 FR:  Well (.) Like I say it's just a janitoral service that 
252      cleans (.) businesses  
253      (0.5)  
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254 FR:  [when they]'re closed 
255 IV:  [Uh   Okay] 
256      (3.0) 
257 IV:  O::::kay::  
258      (1.2)   
259 IV:  And let's see what kinda work does he usually do at his 
260      job .hh uh:: [(ju-)]   
Schaeffer and Maynard, however, suggest that the delay may be a display of uncertainty.  It 
may be an interactional resource, indicating that the answer is perhaps not an expected one in 
that is a repeat of earlier information (Well (.) Like I say).  And the interaction proceeds with 
the interviewer displaying that they have constructed a codable answer from the respondent‟s 
talk.  In terms of what is displayed by the interviewee, the interviewer shows that they have 
picked it up. 
Using a series of examples Schaeffer and Maynard argue that „in many cases the 
interviewer performs work that the individualistic psychological model of cognitive 
processing locates in the respondent‟ (this volume, pp. **).  They claim an agnostic stance on 
the matter of individual cognitions, preferring to focus on what can be observed in the 
interaction, and how the actions of the interviewer contribute to what had traditionally been 
seen as cognitive. 
 
6. Hopper: A cognitive agnostic in conversation analysis.   
This chapter is one of the last pieces of work written by Robert Hopper before his death.  His 
writing has been highly influential within conversation analysis, as has the influence of his 
numerous PhD students across the fields of sociology, communication and social psychology 
(see Glenn, et al., 2003).   This book is dedicated to Robert Hopper – and it is appropriate 
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that he has produced something both subtle on the issue of cognition and fascinating in its 
insight into the early days of the LBJ presidency. 
Hopper‟s discussion of the status of cognition in conversation leads off from John 
Heritage‟s (1990/1991) important paper on the nature of strategy.  Heritage tried to 
distinguish two kinds of strategy.  On the one hand, there is strategy where the actor thinks 
out a goal beforehand and has a conscious, maybe surreptitious plan of how to achieve it.  
Hopper calls this a pre-strategy – a mentally represented strategy existing and guiding the 
subsequent interaction.  On the other, there is strategic action that is the result of simply 
following particular conversational routines (which might have some internal complexity) in 
a non-conscious or planful manner.  Hopper calls this an emergent-strategy as the strategic 
action emerges with the interaction.  As he puts it:  
no participant anticipates or plans this pattern.  Rather, the speakers generate the 
sequence out of the normal turn-by-turn course of interaction.  The pattern turns out to 
be a kind of found art for analysts, and to some degree for actors (this volume, pp. 
**). 
Heritage considers this distinction (differently glossed) in terms of two phone calls 
that are part of a corpus used in many conversation analytic studies.  In each call a personal 
narrative about the recent assassination of Robert Kennedy and the movement of the body is 
„touched off‟ by the organization of the call.  Heritage suggests that the two calls together 
provide evidence for the operation of a pre-strategy.  The surprise displayed in the second call 
seems disingenuous following so soon after the same pattern in the first call.  Hopper is more 
doubtful, and considers the potential workings of these two kinds of strategy in a corpus of 
calls made from and to President Johnson‟s office soon after he became president.  This 
series of calls, often doing rather similar things (thanking supporters, accepting 
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congratulations and so on) allows for a more extended examination of the interactional 
criteria that might be developed for identifying pre-strategies. 
Hopper teases away at these calls, trying to identify what evidence would be strong 
enough.  For example, he notes that LBJ receipted a series of compliments in calls in much 
the same way, but suggests that as a competent conversationalist such receipts are a standard 
resource, and not something that needs to be consciously planned.  However, he notes that the 
pattern of compliment responses evolves through standard forms to something close to 
boasting and fishing for compliments, then back to more standard compliment receipts.  He 
focuses on another feature of the calls, which is the introduction of the term „thrift‟ into 
compliment responses.  Here is an example (C is compliment, CR is compliment receipt, T is 
the „thrift‟ mention): 
C DC:  ...  congratulations on what I thought was a magnificent 
   performance this morning.   
CR LBJ:  Well, I did the best I could. 
C OC:  Well, I thought it was just exceptional (.) really  
CR LBJ:  Bob Anderson and General Eisenhower did say (.) they’re 
T   glad we were talking about economy and prudence and  
watching the dollar ((LBJ continues)) 
Again, Hopper explores the possibility that these mentions are pre-strategy, a way of LBJ 
subtly developing the cost cutting agenda that was part of his presidency while deftly doing 
compliment receipts.  Yet even with these latter examples it is hard to show it was planned 
beforehand, particularly with the fluid insertion in the conversational flow.  Even as a pre-
strategy it would be more Trukese than European!  Hopper concludes cautiously that there 
are some cases where pre-strategies may be operating but they are both a-typical and hard to 
pin down.   Hopper‟s chapter is, in many ways, the centre of the book setting up issues that 
are picked up in a series of studies in the second half of the book.   
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7. Drew: Is confusion a state of mind.   
Like Hopper, Drew introduces his chapter with a series of cautions against the reading of 
„states of mind‟ off what people say.  He notes that the standard conversational patterns for 
turning down invitations, for example, suggest a state of mind on the behalf of the speaker 
(wanting to accept, but constrained by circumstances).  Yet such declinations „can enable 
speakers to disguise their actual states of mind (what their actual intentions are, how they 
really feel etc.)‟ (this volume, pp. **).  Nevertheless, Drew argues that careful analysis of 
examples can reveal a connection between talk-in-interaction and cognition (see also, Drew, 
1995).   
Drew considers examples of invitation refusals where early and inexplicit signs of 
refusal are picked up and acted on.  He suggests these are „cognitive moments‟.  That is, they 
are moments where a speaker can, in a profound sense, read the other‟s mind; they can 
identify intentions and act on those intentions.  He develops this way of thinking with the 
example of „confusion‟.  He starts by considering examples where participants use the 
category „confusion‟ attributionally.  However, he attempts to go beyond such participants‟ 
uses.   
His more ambitious aim is to identify „confusion‟ as a participant‟s mental state that 
has been generated through interaction.  Confusion is explored in detail with a series of 
examples.  Drew identifies a number of features that support the use of the analytic category 
„confusion‟ (including repair initiations, styles of acknowledgement, and characteristics of 
intonation).  Drew notes that this mental confusion is interactionally generated through the 
confounding of expectations derived from conversational norms.  It is the interaction that 
generates the mental state rather than the other way around.  Nevertheless, this confusion as a 
cognitive object need not be salient to participants – for example, participants do not remark 
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on it.  It is not being used as a resource in the interaction, to request clarification say, rather it 
is evidenced through its conversational symptoms.  The general point is to use information 
about interaction and its normative organizations to be able to identify, as an analyst, a 
particular mental state of confusion.  Drew is trying to show how cognitive psychological 
topics can be informed by careful analysis of conversation. 
 
8.  Heritage: Cognition in discourse.   
Heritage‟s important earlier contribution to theorizing issues of cognition and interaction has 
been described above, and is discussed in detail in Hopper‟s chapter.  In his chapter for the 
current volume Heritage starts by noting examples where descriptions of events (in a doctor‟s 
surgery, in a call to the police) are marshalled in a way that displays something about the 
position of the caller as „innocent‟ or „unmotivated‟, thereby underpinning the reasonableness 
or credibility of the reports.  This is linked to a tradition of work that includes studies in 
ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and discursive psychology (Edwards, 1997; 
Heritage, 1984a; Pollner, 1987) and picks up themes that will be explored further in the 
chapters by Wooffitt, Lynch and Bogen, and Edwards and Potter. 
 The focus of this chapter, however, is not the relation of cognition to description, but 
the way cognition may be embodied in talk-in-interaction.  Heritage has done a series of 
studies of the use of the use of the particle „oh‟ in interaction to indicate a „change of state‟ 
(Heritage, 1984b, 1998, 2002).  In his chapter he teases out cognitive themes in this work.  
For example, he considers the way „oh‟ can „embody the experience of a recollection‟ and 
display that experience for interactionally relevant purposes, such as when receiving good or 
bad news, or how it can be used to show that something relevant has been remembered.  In 
the context of questions it can show that the questioner has not expected the answer.  More 
generally, he notes the way „oh-receipts‟ are linked to the interactional-sequential logic of 
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questions where the questioner proposes her or himself as uninformed on some matter and 
simultaneously projects the answerer as informed.  The questioner‟s „oh-receipt‟ marks the 
change of state and ratifies the answer as news.  Where such a logic is absent (in classroom 
teaching, say, or news interviews) so are „oh-receipts‟.   Oh-receipts, then, are closely bound 
up with epistemic issues of who knows and who does not. 
Heritage develops this line of thinking with an exploration of relation between the use 
of oh-receipts and knowledge entitlement.  Oh-receipts can be used to show epistemic 
supremacy in interaction such as the following: 
 Eve: No I haven't seen it Jo saw it 'n she said 
  she f- depressed her ter[ribly 
 Jon:          [Oh it's [terribly depressing.  
 Lyn:          [Oh it's depressing.  
Heritage highlights the way in sequence Jon and Lyn who have seen a film agree with Eve, 
but oh-preface that agreement.  In doing so they index the independence of their access to the 
film „and in this context that, relative to Eve, they have epistemic priority: direct rather than 
indirect, access to the movie‟ (this volume, pp. **). 
Analyses of cases of this kind highlight the way certain elements of talk can be used 
to display changes of knowledge state, or authority compared to other speakers.  Heritage 
returns repeatedly to the fundamental question for this collection; what is the relation of „oh‟ 
to a change in mental state?  His answer is that there may be a relationship: „it might be 
possible to think of oh as directly tied to the experience (and the neuropsychology) of 
undergoing a „change of cognitive state‟, such that the utterance of „oh‟ indexes the arrival of 
such a state as its outward marker‟ (this volume, pp. **).  Nevertheless he offers a number of 
cautions: cognitive states may change gradually while oh utterances are point events; oh may 
be withheld despite the cognitive event; or produced without such an event; and its 
production is subject to interactional and turn organizational considerations.  He argues 
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instead that we treat oh first and foremost as a live matter of participants‟ social concern and 
accountability, rather than an abstract topic of psychological investigation. 
 
9. Wooffitt: From process to practice.   
Heritage, Hopper and Drew focus on particular conversational practices and consider their 
possible involvement with both everyday issues of practical psychological importance and 
their possible status vis-à-vis cognitive states and processes.  They do not tackle the literature 
on cognitive science, or consider the way it has dealt with the relevant phenomena.  In 
contrast, Wooffitt starts off by considering a particular phenomenon in the psychological 
literature, that of „flashbulb memories‟.   The classic account of flashbulb memories has the 
receipt of dramatic or shocking news (of the death of President Kennedy, say) leading to a 
special kind of vivid and enduring memory encoding such that people can not only remember 
the event but the routine circumstances in which they received news of it.  Recent work has 
painted a considerably more complex picture.  However, Wooffitt‟s aim is too show that 
some of the features associated with flashbulb memories are features of the pragmatics of 
describing certain kinds of events; that is, how they are a conversational rather than a 
cognitive phenomenon. 
Wooffitt draws his own earlier work (Wooffitt, 1992) in which he studied the 
organization of reports of „anomalous events‟ (poltergeists, UFOs, and such).  In particular, it 
analysed some of the ways in which speakers constructed reports of such events in ways that 
attend to a likely sceptical audience.  It drew in turn on Sacks‟s (1984) classic work on the 
way people may „do being ordinary‟ for particular purposes and on Jefferson‟s (forthcoming) 
development of this line of thinking.  Wooffitt notes that when participants describe 
anomalous events they are (from a psychological perspective) recollecting those events; the 
descriptions can be studied as memories.   
 - 65 - 
Wooffitt picks out a number of features of these descriptions that might be relevant to 
cognitive research.  For example, they commonly contain X-Y constructions where the X is a 
description of the speaker‟s actions and Y is the report of the first awareness of the 
phenomenon: 
   an' I went in there (.) er:m w- with my mother in  
   law and uhm: (.4) friends that were with me 
   (1.3) 
  X hhh (.) and I was just looking at the coffin 
  Y and there was David standing there (.3) 
   he was in Blues 
Wooffitt argues that the X part of these formulations works as a device designed to establish 
and display the mundane environment of the experience and the mundane orientation to it by 
the speaker.  As the first part of a contrast it sets up, and highlights, the special or unusual 
nature of the Y component.  It also displays what the speaker was not doing, that is hoping or 
waiting for something anomalous to happen, and thus perhaps displaying a out of the 
ordinary beliefs.  For Wooffitt the point about this pragmatic organization of reports is that if 
we fail to grasp its practical and rhetorical orientation we may start to see it simply as the 
consequence of cognitive coding.  So the idea that flashbulb memories encode mundane 
particulars in the brain, through some cognitive and neurological process, fails to consider 
that such particulars may be an artefact of reporting anomalous or dramatic events.  More 
generally, Wooffitt argues for an enriched approach to human memory, less focused on its 
cognitive or neurological basis and more attentive to its pragmatics. 
 
10. Lynch & Bogen: My memory has been shredded.   
Like Wooffitt, Lynch and Bogen focus on a phenomenon that cognitive psychologists would 
subsume under the category memory.  While Wooffitt draws more directly on conversation 
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analysis and the work of Sacks and Jefferson, Lynch and Bogen draw on ethnomethodology, 
and the work of Garfinkel as well as the broader tradition of linguistic philosophy.  Like 
Coulter, they are less concerned to develop a dialogue or rapprochement with cognitive 
psychologists, than to rework everything.  As they argue that they are not aiming to provide 
an alternative geography of cognition „because the concept of „cognition‟ itself is likely to be 
dissolved in the course of the displacement from an abstract space of mental representation to 
a contexture of communicative practices‟ (this volume, pp. **).    
Lynch and Bogen‟s approach to „cognitive‟ topics works with three intertwined 
strategies.  First, select a cognitive science topic such as memory or perception, but located 
within a particular social setting.  Second, consider how this topic becomes intelligible 
through actions and expressions that are bound to, and understandable within, interactional, 
pragmatic and political contexts.  Third, provide an understanding of the available 
descriptions of cognitive events or processes in terms of their role in interaction. 
Building on their influential study of national scandals, and Iran-Contra in particular 
(Lynch & Bogen, 1996), they illustrate these basic strategies using the kinds of materials 
(senate hearings, recordings, documents) that those scandals have incidentally made 
available.  For example, they examine the use of „memory lapses‟ in Oliver North‟s 
contributions to the Iran-Contra investigation, and the way practices of shredding documents 
were developed to provide for „plausible deniability‟ of key claims.  North used „I don‟t 
remember‟ in testimony so many times it came to be called the Contra-mantra.  They show 
how his „don‟t remember‟ responses had the virtue of defeating what McHoul (1987) calls 
the binary logic of yes-no questions.  The problem with such questions is that either option 
can lead to further trouble.  On the one hand, a „yes‟ can implicate guilt.  On the other, a 
denial is vulnerable to suggesting strategic dissembling if further contradictory evidence is 
produced.   
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Lynch and Bogen focus in particular on the interactional logic that distinguishes „I 
forgot‟ from „I don‟t remember‟, noting that the former potentially concedes much more.  
They also discuss the role of the counterfactual conditional form of many memory claims in 
the testimony.  These are claims of the form: 
North: I was probably told that in eighty-five or I would’ve 
asked more questions that I did about it. 
In this case, for example, North is able to present a failure to remember something as 
indicative that his was acting in an appropriate manner; that is, a manner that would be 
unremarkable and therefore unmemorable.  They conclude: 
The possibilities of remembering and forgetting are thus logically bound to 
assessments of particular persons and agent-categories, and are associated with 
judgments about plausibility and credibility and defences against accusation (this 
volume, pp. **). 
They are particularly pessimistic about any integration of this research with the domain of 
„cognitive science‟, arguing instead that they are addressing topics in their home environment 
in a way that cognitive scientists have failed to do. 
 
11. Edwards & Potter: Discursive psychology, mental states and descriptions.   
As we have noted above, Edwards and Potter have been developing a distinctive discursive 
psychological approach for over a decade, applied to „psychological‟ topics such as memory, 
attribution, categories, scripts and so on (see Edwards, 1997; Edwards & Potter, 1992, 1993).  
This chapter picks out some of the themes in this work as well as summarising its general 
programmatic features.  It summarises three basic strands of DP work: (a) it has respecified 
and criticised mainstream cognitive research; (b) it has produced analytic studies of the 
psychological thesaurus, exploring the situated and rhetorical uses of psychological terms in 
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peoples‟ talk; (c) it studies the way psychological themes and orientations are managed, 
whether psychological terms are used or not.   
This chapter picks out strand b in particular, but simultaneously addresses the central 
DP issue of how descriptions of actions and events provide for psychological inferences.  It 
deals variously with knowing and not knowing, telling, wanting, hoping, liking and not 
liking, and thinking.  In each case, the aim is to show how the delicate situated rhetorical use 
of those psychological terms is bound up with the performance of practical actions.  A 
particular theme of these analyses is to show that such terms cannot be understood as simply 
the expressions of mental states in the manner of telementation.  They can thus be contrasted 
with cognitive science approaches that might look to treat such words as cognitive tokens.   
DP can also be contrasted with a linguistic philosophical approach of the kind 
developed by Ryle and Wittgenstein and illustrated in this collection by Coulter.  Part of this 
contrast is that DP does not attempt to show cognitivist understandings are incoherent or 
wrong, but rather to study their use as a practice within public forms of discourse (see Potter 
& Edwards, 2003).  People may talk on the „proposed and oriented to basis, that their words 
are expressing inner thoughts and feelings‟ (this volume, pp. **) in clinical psychology, for 
example, or everyday settings.  This becomes the analytic topic of DP.  This special kind of 
„indifference‟ is similar to that pressed by Lynch and Bogen, and by Wooffitt, although 
Wooffitt is more optimistic about the potential for fruitful dialogue with cognitive scientists, 
as are Edwards and Potter. 
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5. Issues and implications 
 
This collection includes a range of mature analyses of interaction.  Although they take 
various positions on the status of cognition, and the different kinds of things cognition might 
be (if anything at all!) they offer very different kinds of analyses to those common in 
cognitive science.  Even Sanders – who in terms of this collection is most directly 
sympathetic to the application of cognitive science ideas to interaction research –works with 
a style of analysis unusual in, maybe even antithetical to, the overwhelmingly experimental 
and conceptual modelling tradition of cognitive work.  We will end this introduction and 
overview by highlighting a few of the issues and implications that will be addressed in 
different ways in the collection.  Without attempting to be comprehensive we will address 
three themes raised by the chapters and ask more questions than we answer.  We hope that 
readers can usefully hold these in mind while reading the chapters and perhaps return to them 
at the end. 
 
Plans, strategies and the language of mind 
We have already noted a tension between the model of cognitive processes as 
operating through a language of mind which is closely related to the folk psychology of 
desires, goals, plans and so on and the ethnomethodological approach to goals and plans that 
emphasizes their complex and often post hoc relation to practice.  As we indicated in our 
discussion of Suchman‟s (1987) work, in the ethnomethodological picture plans are as much 
to do with accountability as they are causal templates driving action.    
Hopper‟s paper attempts to address the issue of planning through a focus on process.  
Can we capture the working of planning in interaction through considering the procedures for 
receiving compliments?  He searches for evidence that pre-strategies have been in operation 
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in a series of such receipts.  He asks if there is evidence that the speaker has strategically (in a 
consciously prepared way) thought out a modification of a compliment receipt to achieve a 
secondary purpose (e.g. to emphasize the theme of „thrift‟ to key figures that will be 
politically important)?  He shows that it is particularly difficult to analytically pin down the 
operation of such pre-strategies.  Part of the difficulty is that any strategy will have to play 
out through the contingencies of interaction and work with socially established 
conversational procedures.  Therefore if there is a strategy at work it has to be fluid and 
responsive. 
This study raises as many deep questions as it answers.  If it can be established that 
there may be pre-strategy at work, as Hopper asserts, this leaves the question of what the 
status of such a strategy is.  The sort of evidence that is provided is of modifications to 
standard forms, or standard forms being organized to allow them to piggyback further 
actions.  The implication is that the standard forms are automatic and strategy allows a further 
level of orchestration of the automatic forms, e.g. to build references to thrift into 
complement receipts.  However, that does not demonstrate that such a „higher order‟ plan 
was „represented‟ in „consciousness‟, perhaps in a propositional form, although it implies a 
picture of that kind.  It clarifies the deep cognitive science question, because it directs 
research attention to particular phenomena, but it does not answer that question.  For 
example, could we conceive the sorts of „higher order‟ strategic „thinking‟ suggested in 
Hopper‟s chapter to be itself standardized, more off-the-shelf than bespoke, not requiring a 
unique propositional solution but dependent on the kind of rich conversational learning 
history that a human would have who used talk as their major means of getting things done, 
day in day out, throughout their lives?   
Pomerantz has a more developed cognitive ontology in her chapter, suggesting that 
understanding, aims and concerns can all, on occasion, be treated as cognitive phenomena 
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that influence how a person selects and employs a specific practice.  Although she argues 
effectively for the value of methods of stimulated recall in accessing such things and thereby 
contributing to improvements in practices, this does not in itself, show that such things are 
cognitive phenomena in the way that a cognitive psychologist might understand the term.  To 
show that a concern can be usefully „accessed‟ does not in itself show that the concern is a 
cognitive object, a combination of propositions and emotional colour perhaps, existing in a 
mental space (for a contrasting analysis of „concern‟ see, Potter & Hepburn, 2003).  
Concerns, aims and understandings are vital parts of lay accounting and they may appear as 
such in the stimulated recall setting.  That does not make their use in that methodological 
setting a merely descriptive one.  Pomerantz argues that we should distinguish between a 
display of understanding, for example, and actual understanding.  But even if this distinction 
can be sustained, it does not in itself show that understanding must be understood as a 
cognitive state (Coulter, 1979).   
 
Moments of Mind Reading 
Both Drew and, to a lesser extent, Heritage operate with a distinction between „verbal 
conduct‟ and the speaker‟s „cognitive state‟.  Plainly this distinction is fundamental for 
exploring the potential connection between this interactional research and research in 
cognitive science.  However, is this distinction discovered in their material, or is it assumed?  
Is what Drew calls a „cognitive state‟ the same thing as a cognitive scientist would mean by 
that term?  We have described some of the variety of assumptions about cognitive state in 
section 3 above.   Drew suggests, in a move similar that of Pomerantz, that the CA use of the 
term „orient to‟ for characterizing certain features of conduct may be an (inexplicit) cognitive 
usage.  That is, it may simply stand for a cognitive state.  From this perspective when Emma 
orients to a delay in accepting an invitation as indicating that her invitation is going to be 
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turned down, she is (mentally, internally) recognizing that the declination is coming (Drew, 
this volume, pp. **).  The key point, though, is the status of such a recognition.  Is it a word 
that is practically useful to explicate Emma‟s conduct (for example, the upgrading of the 
invitation with the provision of beer), or is it a conscious (or even unconscious) cognitive 
state?  Does Drew analytically confirm the latter, or is the latter a plausible everyday 
characterization of what is going on in a culture that tends to offer cognitive characterizations 
of conduct? 
Take the example of „confusion‟, which is Drew‟s main topic.  He brilliantly marshals 
the procedures and findings of CA to identify confusion in conduct.  Most relevantly, his 
analysis attempts to identify confusion that is neither oriented to as such nor used as a 
resource.  However, assuming that he has been successful in this task, does this success show 
that there is an associated cognitive state of confusion?  Does everything that people do or 
show have an associated mental state?  Is Drew discovering the presence and consequence of 
cognition or presupposing it?   
Similar questions can be posed with respect to Heritage‟s analysis of oh-receipts and 
changes of state.  His analysis skilfully delineates the various pieces of interactional work 
that „oh‟ particles can perform.  And he highlights various lines of interactional evidence that 
suggest that although „oh‟ signals a change of state it does not necessarily accompany on a 
momentary basis a change in experience, or cognitive state, or neuropsychology.   
The question that remains is whether some inner, psychologically represented change 
(in consciousness, or cognition, or neural states) takes place, whether yoked immediately to 
„oh‟ or somewhat temporally disengaged.  Does the existence of such a change require any 
specific cognitive analysis?  Could „change of state‟ be an interactionally inspired gloss on 
something that we can both access analytically, and recognise as language users, but not 
require that there is a difference in propositional representations embodied somewhere in 
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neuroanatomy?  Could it be equally compatible with some kind of yet to be fully developed 
connectionist account of competent conduct that requires no realized propositional 
representations?  Indeed, could „oh-receipts‟ and the „changes of states‟ they signal be useful 
accounting devices primarily oriented to action, providing a neat, simplified practical way of 
displaying position change in interaction as an easily understood either/or?  
However challenging these questions are for interaction analysis they are at least as 
challenging for cognitive science insofar as they incorporate either implicit or explicit 
theories of conduct.  The beautifully realized analysis of Drew and Heritage identify 
phenomena of interaction that a comprehensive cognitive theory of action would need to 
account for and so far the image of conduct in cognitive science has tended to be abstract and 
simplified. 
 
The study of Mind in Action 
The possibility of creative debate between cognitive scientists and interaction 
researchers is an exciting one, and one we hope this collection encourages.  As we have 
indicated, although potentially fruitful the dialogue will be a complex one.  The differences 
are not just of theory and findings; they are about metatheoretical assumptions and 
methodological practices.  For cognitive science researchers used to testing claims through 
experimental simulations or abstract programming exercises, the sorts of detailed, inductively 
based descriptive studies typical of conversation analysis and discursive psychology are 
likely to be hard to accommodate.  Hopefully, this volume will highlight the value of taking 
this research seriously. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that some of the interactional research will generate more 
critical tension with cognitive science work.  At the level of theory, interactional research 
underscores difficulties with the idea of an actor as a socially isolated problem solver.  Even 
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the researchers in this collection who most fully embrace at least the principle of cognitive 
states and representations as a topic of study (Sanders, Pomerantz, Drew and, perhaps more 
cautiously, Heritage, Hopper and Schaeffer and Maynard) highlight just how far any potential 
cognitive analysis must take into account of socially shared and conventionalized procedures 
of interaction.  At the level of method, different strands of interaction research in both CA 
and DP have highlighted the failures of cognitive science research to encompass the action 
orientation of talk in research settings.  Schaeffer and Maynard provide an excellent example 
of this in their chapter.  It may be that at least some of the inferences from cognitive research 
studies are artefacts of the failure to appreciate this action orientation (see Edwards, 1997).   
Outside of these different kinds of engagement there is another possibility here 
developed most explicitly in Wooffitt, Lynch and Bogen, and Edwards & Potter, and 
underscored by Coulter‟s critique of the very enterprise of cognitive science.  This would 
involve the development of a field of study that would consider phenomena that had been 
subsumed into cognitive science from a practical and interactional perspective.  It would 
consider both the (ostensibly) mental lexicon and its role in various mundane and institutional 
practices, and the way (purportedly) psychological issues (knowledge, accountability, 
attitude, stake and interest) figure within particular practices.  This approach would be non-
cognitivist in that it would not attempt to explain conduct by reference to cognitive entities 
(such as knowledge, motive, attitudes and so on); those things would figure as topics of 
study.  Whatever else they are, all of the contributions to this volume could be understood as 
contributions to such an enterprise.  Whether it is called the sociology of mind, praxiology, 
discursive psychology or even social psychology (psychology in and for social practices – 
why not?) such an interdiscipline has exciting prospects. 
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